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Assisted dying 
     
CHAPTER 2 [16 bold cap centre] 
 
 
ASSISTED DYING [16 bold cap centre] 
 
 
Carmen Draghici [16 bold centre] 
 
 
 For decades, sufferers of locked-in syndrome and terminally ill patients have attempted to persuade 
lawmakers that their fundamental rights are infringed by laws which criminalise the assistance given 
to mentally competent adults seeking a peaceful and dignified death. In this debate, the UK and 
Canada have positioned themselves at opposite ends of the spectrum. In the UK, human-rights 
challenges to the blanket prohibition on assisted suicide have been consistently unsuccessful (notably 
the Nicklinson1 and Conway2 cases), as have parliamentary reform initiatives.3 Conversely, Canada’s  
Supreme Court ruled a similar ban unconstitutional in its landmark Carter decision,4 and the national 
legislature amended the Criminal Code to allow medical assistance in dying (“MAiD”) in some 
circumstances.5 This chapter examines the legal and ethical issues underlying these contrasting 
developments, and suggests – in common with the conclusion reached by other contributors to this 
volume – that Canada’s response has been more rigorous in evaluating and reconciling competing 
claims.  
   
 
I. The resilience of the British blanket ban on assisted dying [A heading: 14 bold] 
 
In England and Wales, “encouraging and assisting” another to commit suicide is criminalised under 
s.2(1) Suicide Act (“SA”) 19616 and punishable with up to fourteen years’ imprisonment;7 the statute 
contemplates no exceptions.  Parliamentary debates leading to its adoption reveal mainly practical 
objections to the continued criminalisation of attempted suicide.8 They indicate that, while 
decriminalisation was not intended to encourage or condone what was viewed as a mortal sin, it was 
thought that persons having attempted suicide did not benefit from prison treatment and that the law 
 
1 R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38. 
 
2 R (Conway) v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] EWCA Civ 1431. 
 
3 See sections I and VI. 
 
4 Carter v Canada (Attorney General [“AG”]) [2015] 1 SCR 331. 
 
5 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (medical assistance in dying), S.C. 2016, c. 3 (Bill C-14). See new ss. 241.1- 241.3 
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
 
6 As amended by s.59(2) Coroners and Justice Act 2009. See Wicks (2016) The State and the body: Legal regulation of 
bodily autonomy pp 71-85. 
 
7 Under Scottish law, the potential consequence is life imprisonment. See Stark (2014) ‘Necessity and policy in R 
(Nicklinson and others) v Ministry of Justice’ Edinburgh LR 104 at p107. 
 
8 See HLD 2 March 1961 c. 247-276; HLD 9 March 1961 c. 535-561; HLD 16 March 1961 c. 975-990; HCD 14 July 
1961 c. 834-845; HCD 19 July 1961 c. 1408-1426; HCD 28 July 1961 c. 823-825. 
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ought to focus on society’s responsibility to assist them. Concerns were expressed that, without 
recourse to penal machinery, the police would no longer have compulsory powers to look after such 
persons and mental health treatment might be refused. There was, conversely, no discussion about 
the possible exemption of assisters from criminal liability. Several legal challenges to s.2(1) were 
brought by individuals suffering from irreversible medical conditions and wishing to end their lives, 
but who either were physically unable to do so without assistance from a family member or healthcare 
professional or wanted to avoid a traumatic and premature self-inflicted death.   
 
 
The Pretty litigation [B heading; 12 bold] 
 
 The first case was Pretty v Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”).9 The complainant suffered 
from motor neuron disease, was paralysed from the neck down, tube-fed and nearly incapable of 
speaking, with a few-month life expectancy, and wished to be assisted to die before the painful and 
humiliating final stages of her illness. She challenged the DPP’s refusal to issue an undertaking not 
to prosecute her husband if he helped her travel to Switzerland, where the Dignitas service lawfully 
provides MAiD.  
 The House of Lords found that her fundamental rights were not engaged by the DPP’s decision. The 
right-to-life guarantee in Art 2 ECHR did not encompass a right to die.10 Nor did the denial of 
proleptic immunity from prosecution constitute inhuman treatment contrary to Art 3 ECHR, insofar 
as Mrs Pretty’s suffering stemmed from her disease, not the impugned decision.11 The court also 
rejected the contention that personal autonomy, as protected under Art 8 ECHR, included a right to 
decide when or how one wished to die.12 Even if Art 8 was engaged, the Law Lords reasoned, the 
interference was justified by the need to protect a broader class of vulnerable persons who would 
otherwise be induced to commit suicide.13 The court equally dismissed the claim under Art 9 ECHR: 
freedom of conscience did not include the right to act upon a belief held, and, if the provision was 
engaged, the restriction aimed to protect vulnerable persons and was permissible.14 Having found no 
substantive ECHR right engaged, the court further dismissed the claim that the applicant had suffered 
discrimination contrary to Art 14 on the ground of disability.15 
 When Pretty was examined by the ECtHR, the key distinction from the House of Lords’ analysis 
was the unequivocal recognition that Art 8 applies to right-to-die claims. According to the Strasbourg 
court, the notion of “private life” covers “the physical and psychological integrity of a person” and 
“personal autonomy”.16 This extends to conduct threatening one’s own life: 
 
 
9 R (Pretty) v DPP [2001] UKHL 61. See Pedain (2003) ‘The human rights dimension of the Diane Pretty case’ 
Cambridge LJ 181. 
 
10 [2001] UKHL 61 at [59], [62], [87].  
 
11 Ibid at [92]-[97]. 
 
12 Ibid at [61]. 
 
13 Ibid at [26], [30], [99]-[102]. 
 
14 Ibid at [63]. 
 
15 Ibid at [105]. 
 
16 Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1 at [61]. Arts 3 and 9 claims were dismissed; ibid at [53]-[56], [82]-[83]. See Merkouris 
(2011) ‘Assisted suicide in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: A matter of life and death’ p107 




[10 normal] [62] [T]he ability to conduct one’s life in a manner of one’s own choosing may also include the opportunity 
to pursue activities perceived to be of a physically or morally harmful or dangerous nature for the individual concerned.  
 
The court drew a parallel with patients’ right to refuse life-prolonging medical treatment, grounded 
in the same principle of (potentially self-harming) autonomy.17 Consequently, criminalising assisted 
suicide interfered with Art 8 rights and required justification. Despite this favourable premise, the 
ECtHR accepted that the measure was within the UK’s margin of appreciation and proportionate to 
the aim pursued, ie the protection of the life of vulnerable persons unable to make informed 
decisions.18 After Pretty v UK, unsuccessful attempts between 2003 and 2006 to pass an Assisted 
Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill left the law unchanged.19 
 
 
The Purdy litigation [12 bold] 
 
 In R (Purdy) v DPP,20 the House of Lords followed Pretty v UK and recognised the applicability of 
Art 8 to right-to-die cases. The claimant’s position was similar to Mrs Pretty’s: she suffered from 
primary progressive multiple sclerosis, an incurable disease causing gradual deterioration, and needed 
her husband’s assistance to travel to Switzerland to end her life before her condition became 
intolerable.21 Her legal claim was, however, different. It neither attacked s.2(1) SA 1961 nor 
challenged the unavailability of proleptic guarantee of non-prosecution for carers providing 
assistance. Rather, she questioned the insufficient clarity of s.4 of the Act as regards the DPP’s 
exercise of discretion to allow prosecution, which made it impossible to reach an informed decision 
on whether to request assistance.22  
 The court cited Lord Hope’s acknowledgement of self-determination rights in Pretty, endorsed by 
the ECtHR:23 “The way she chooses to pass the closing moments of her life is part of the act of living, 
and she has a right to ask that this too must be respected.”24 According to the judgment, the Code for 
Crown Prosecutors did not ensure predictability as regards the consequences of aiding a person who 
is terminally-ill or severely and incurably disabled and wishes to travel to a country where assisted 
suicide is lawful, having decisional capacity and fully understanding the consequences;25 therefore, 
it did not protect the right to exercise a genuinely autonomous choice.26 The court concluded that the 
interference with private life was not “in accordance with the law” as required under Art 8(2) ECHR, 
as it did not satisfy the criteria of accessibility and foreseeability; the absence of a crime-specific 
 
17 (2002) 35 EHRR 1 at [63]. 
 
18 Ibid at [74]-[78].  
 
19 See Keown (2012) The law and ethics and medicine. Essays on the inviolability of human life pp 235-274. 
 
20 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45. 
  
21 Ibid at [17]. 
 
22 Ibid at [30]-[31], [42]. 
 
23 (2002) 35 EHRR 1 at [64]. 
 
24 [2002] 1 AC 800 at [100].  
 
25 [2009] UKHL 45 at [54]. 
 
26 Ibid at [65]. 
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policy regulating the DPP’s consent to prosecution did not allow the public to anticipate how 
prosecutorial discretion would be exercised in assisted suicide cases.27   
 The judgment led the DPP to adopt new policy guidance in 2010.28 Whilst the document did not 
introduce exemptions from s.2 SA 1961, it established that prosecution “is less likely to be required” 
if:  
 
[10 normal] [45] 1. the victim had reached a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to commit suicide; 2. the 
suspect was wholly motivated by compassion; 3. the actions of the suspect, although sufficient to come within the 
definition of the offence, were of only minor encouragement or assistance; 4. the suspect had sought to dissuade the victim 
from taking the course of action which resulted in his or her suicide; 5. the actions of the suspect may be characterised as 
reluctant encouragement or assistance in the face of a determined wish on the part of the victim to commit suicide; 6. the 
suspect reported the victim’s suicide to the police and fully assisted them in their enquiries into the circumstances of the 
suicide or the attempt and his or her part in providing encouragement or assistance. 
 
The policy guidance further states that the list of public interest factors tending against prosecution is 
not exhaustive; each case must be considered on its own merits.29 
  
 
The Nicklinson litigation [B heading; 12 bold] 
 
 In 2014, Nicklinson belied the prediction that, having grounded a right to die in personal autonomy, 
Purdy heralded the legalisation of assisted suicide.30 The litigants (Mr Nicklinson, Mr Lamb and 
Martin) were afflicted by catastrophic disabilities as a result of a stroke or automobile accident, almost 
completely paralysed and unable to communicate, and described their lives as “miserable”, 
“demeaning”, “distressing”, “intolerable”, “undignified”.31 They had reached a settled decision to end 
their lives and wished to have a doctor or carer assist them in administering lethal drugs or travelling 
to Dignitas.  
 They required the Supreme Court to either interpret s.2 SA 1961 as permitting the assistance sought, 
so as to reconcile that provision with ECHR rights per s.3 Human Rights Act (“HRA”), or to issue a 
s.4 declaration of incompatibility. The DPP appealed the lower court’s decision that the prosecutorial 
policy was still insufficiently detailed; Martin’s cross-appeal claimed that the decision had not gone 
far enough.  
 The Supreme Court majority continued to uphold the blanket prohibition.32 First, protecting the 
vulnerable was a legitimate aim under Art 8(2) ECHR: 
 
[10 normal] [171] The main justification advanced for an absolute prohibition on assisting suicide … is the perceived risk 
to the lives of other, vulnerable individuals who might feel themselves a burden to their family, friends or society and 
might, if assisted suicide were permitted, be persuaded or convince themselves that they should undertake it, when they 
would not otherwise do so.  
 
 
27 [2009] UKHL 45 at [40]-[41], [46]-[56].   
 
28 DPP (2010) Suicide: policy for prosecutors in respect of cases of encouraging or assisting suicide (updated 2014); 
 https://www.cps.gov.UK/legal-guidance/suicide-policy-prosecutors-respect-cases-encouraging-or-assisting-suicide. 
 
29 Ibid at [47]. 
 
30 See Cleary (2010) ‘From “personal autonomy” to “death-on-demand”: Will Purdy v. DPP legalize assisted suicide in 
the UK?’ Boston College International and Comparative LR 289 at p304.  
 
31 [2015] AC 657 at [3], [8], [9]. 
 
32 [2015] AC 657. 
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The interference with Art 8 was also found proportionate, insofar as no lesser measure, such as a 
permissive scheme accompanied by safeguards against error and abuse, could secure that aim. For 
Lord Neuberger: “it is impossible ... to say with confidence in advance that any such scheme could 
satisfactorily and appropriately be fashioned.”33  
 Conversely, Lady Hale reasoned, dissenting, that a system identifying well-informed requests for 
assistance in dying was achievable; 34 the law therefore exceeded the minimum interference necessary: 
 
[10 normal] [317] To the extent that the current universal prohibition prevents those who would qualify under such a 
procedure from securing the help they need, I consider that it is a disproportionate interference with their right to choose 
the time and manner of their deaths. … It fails to strike a fair balance between the rights of those who have freely chosen 
to commit suicide but are unable to do so without some assistance and the interests of the community as a whole. 
 
  The majority’s analysis was further influenced by the role accorded to the legislature in weighing 
conflicting interests in controversial policy areas and the presence of an assisted dying bill before 
Parliament; irrespective of the proportionality of the ban, they viewed a s.4 declaration institutionally 
or constitutionally inappropriate.35  
 For the ECtHR, the Supreme Court’s refusal to pronounce on the law’s ECHR-compatibility did not 
breach applicants’ Art 8 procedural rights, insofar as the substance of the claim had been heard, it 
was open to courts to find that sensitive matters were better left to Parliament, and the great weight 
attached by judges to Parliament’s views: “does not mean that they failed to carry out any balancing 
exercise”.36    
 A reform proposal was introduced in June 2016 in the Lords but made no progress. The scheme of 
the Assisted Dying Bill 2016-2017 was predicated on High Court authorisation of assistance for 
terminally-ill adults, “reasonably expected to die within six months”, who have decisional capacity 
and express a “voluntary, clear, settled and informed wish” to die, in a declaration countersigned by 
two medical practitioners verifying those circumstances and that the person has been informed of 
palliative care options.37  
 The matter soon returned before the courts; post-Nicklinson case-law contradicted the expectation 




The Conway litigation [B heading; 12 bold] 
 
 The 2017 challenge to s.2(1) SA in Conway differed from Nicklinson in four respects: it regarded 
terminally-ill patients with a six-month prognosis rather than individuals facing acute suffering 
indefinitely; the applicant was still physically capable of the final act required to end his life; a 
legislative scheme was offered as an alternative to the blanket ban; and no bill was before Parliament 
on the matter.39  
 
33 Ibid at [186], [188]. 
 
34 Ibid at [314]. 
 
35 See section VI.  
 
36 See Nicklinson v UK (2015) 61 EHHR SE7 at [84]-[85]. 
 
37 HL Bill 42 Arts 1-3. See also the End of Life Assistance (Scotland) Bill 2010, discussed in Mason (2010) ‘Assistance 
in dying or euthanasia? Comments on the End of Life Assistance (Scotland) Bill 2010’ Edinburgh LR 493.  
 
38 See Attaran (2015) ‘Unanimity on death and dignity – legalising physician-assisted dying in Canada’ New England 
Journal of Medicine 2080 at p2082. 
 
39 R (Conway) v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] EWHC 2447 (Admin). 
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 The High Court rejected the claim, citing precedent, Parliament’s repeated reaffirmations of its 
position, and ‘slippery slope’ concerns.40 The Court of Appeal agreed that Parliament was better 
placed to assess  highly contested policy issues and conflicted evidence and that it had shown 
readiness to consider reform.41 The appellate judgment also supported the finding that Mr Conway’s 
scheme did not adequately protect the vulnerable, failed to give proper weight to the sanctity of life, 
and could undermine trust between doctor and patient.42  
 In 2018, the Supreme Court dismissed Mr Conway’s application for permission to appeal, adducing 
that his claim had insufficient prospects of success.43 It did not engage in any substantive analysis, 
merely noting that judges’ opinions differed as to whether the absolute ban is a justified interference 
with Convention rights, and, if so, whether it is appropriate to make a declaration to that effect. 
Considering the four-year timespan lapsed since, in Nicklinson, the court had expressed confidence 
in Parliament’s reconsideration of the law, and the different factual and legal matrix in Conway, it 
may have been in the public interest to allow the debate to continue, informed by the insights of the 
highest judicial authority.  
 
 
The latest challenges: T and Newby [B heading; 12 bold] 
 
 R (T) v Secretary of State for Justice44 and Newby45 further tested the resilience of the British ban. 
Unlike Mr Conway, Mr T suffered from multiple system atrophy and his death was not foreseeable 
in the immediate future; he wished to be able to die safely, painlessly and with dignity. In deciding 
on a preliminary issue regarding evidence, the High Court indicated that it was bound by the 
intervening Conway decision in the Court of Appeal and that Mr T’s position was not sufficiently 
different.46 Permission to lodge a “leapfrog” appeal to the Supreme Court was denied as premature.47 
As the post-script to the judgment notes, after its circulation to the parties the claimant travelled to 
Switzerland with assistance to end his life. 
 In 2019, the Newby case cemented the judiciary’s reluctance to take a stand on assisted dying. Citing 
Conway and Nicklinson, the High Court held that: “the courts lack legitimacy and expertise on moral 
(as opposed to legal) questions”.48 Not only was Parliament seen as the appropriate forum for 




40 Ibid at [115], [127]. 
 
41 [2018] EWCA Civ 1431 at [186]-[189], [200], [205]-[206]. 
 
42 Ibid at [204]. 
 
43 R (Conway) v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] UNSC B1 at [7]-[8]. 
 
44 R (T) v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] EWHC 2615 (Admin). 
 
45 R (Newby) v Secretary of State for Justice [2019] EWHC 3118 (Admin).  
 
46 [2018] EWHC 2615 (Admin) at [22]. 
 
47 Ibid at [25]-[26]. 
 
48 [2019] EWHC 3118 (Admin) at [40].  
 
49 Ibid at [38], [43], [50]. 
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[10 normal] [42] [T]here are some questions which, plainly and simply, cannot be ‘resolved’ by a court as no objective, 
single, correct answer can be said to exist. … The private views of judges on such moral and political questions are 
irrelevant, and spring from no identifiable legal principle.  
 
The Newby case included a novel submission: the law prompted the applicant to take his life 
prematurely before reaching the stage where unassisted suicide became impossible. For the High 
Court, the considerations on which Art 8 claims failed under Conway also applied to Art 2.50   
 Although Nicklinson appeared to be “a final warning for Parliament to act”,51 the focus on procedural 
objections to adjudicating assisted-dying claims in subsequent case-law suggests that a reappraisal of 
the matter by the judiciary is unlikely in the near future. The open-ended approach in Nicklinson was 
replaced by the view that assisted-dying policy is not governed by legal principles and it would be 
inappropriate for courts to decide instead of Parliament. 
 
 
II. The Canadian assisted dying reform: striking a fair(er) balance?  
[A heading; 14 bold] 
 
Before June 2016, Canada’s approach to assisted dying mirrored the UK’s SA 1961. Whilst suicide 
was decriminalised in 1972,52 assisters incurred criminal liability as a result of the combined operation 
of two Criminal Code provisions: s.241(b) made it an offence to aid or abet a person in committing 
suicide and s.14 established that no person could consent to death being inflicted on them. Legislative 
reform was triggered, however, by legal challenges under the Canadian Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (“the Charter”).  
 
 
The Rodriguez litigation [B heading; 12 bold]  
 
 A first constitutional challenge was brought in 1993 in Rodriguez v British Colombia,53 and the 
Canadian Supreme Court upheld the absolute ban on assisted dying for reasons similar to those 
underpinning UK rulings. The appellant, afflicted by amyotrophic lateral sclerosis with a prognosis 
of 2-14 months, expected to rapidly lose her ability to swallow, speak and move unassisted, and 
thereafter become unable to breathe or eat without medical equipment. She wished that, when she 
could no longer enjoy life, a physician be permitted to provide the technical means enabling her to 
die when she chose. She unsuccessfully sought a declaration that s.241(b) of the Criminal Code 
breached her Charter rights under s.7 (life, liberty and security of the person), s.12 (protection against 
cruel treatment) and s.15(1) (non-discrimination).54 
 Unlike the first British assisted-dying ruling, Rodriguez recognised the ban’s interference with 
fundamental rights; personal security in s.7 was found to encompass: “personal autonomy, at least ... 
the right to make choices concerning one’s own body, control over one’s physical and psychological 
 
50 Ibid at [49]. 
 
51 Davis and Finlay (2015) ‘Would judicial consent for assisted dying protect vulnerable people?’ British Medical Journal 
(vol.351). 
 
52 The provision criminalising attempted suicide (s.238 Criminal Code 1892, S.C. 1892, c.29) was repealed by the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act 1972, S.C. 1972, c.13. 
 
53 Rodriguez v British Columbia (AG) [1993] 3 SCR 519. See Freedman (1994) ‘The Rodriguez case: sticky questions 
and slippery answers’ McGill LJ 644. 
 
54 [1993] 3 SCR 519 at pp 530-531. 
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integrity, and basic human dignity”.55 The court conceded that, by depriving the appellant of 
autonomy over her person, s.241(b) caused her physical pain and psychological stress which 
impinged on the security of her person.56 Nonetheless, in a markedly split decision, the court found 
that the interference was not contrary to the principles of fundamental justice, which require a fair 
balance between State and individual interests. The prohibition aimed to protect vulnerable persons 
who might be induced to commit suicide and reflected the State’s policy in upholding the value of 
human life, grounded in society’s fundamental belief in the sanctity of life.57 Additionally, a similar 
prohibition was the norm in most Western democracies.58 As regards the alleged s.12 violation, 
“treatment” required more active State process, rather than a mere prohibition on certain conduct.59 
Finally, the court deemed it preferable not to pronounce on the scope of s.15, but to assume that it 
was infringed, as any infringement was justified under s.1: the prohibition was rationally connected 
to the objective of protecting, and maintaining respect for, human life, and no half-way measure could 
achieve it; there was no assurance that an exception could limit assisted death to patients who 
genuinely desired it.60 The majority also accepted that, in this contentious morals-laden area, 
Parliament had to be afforded flexibility; as long as the government had reasonable grounds to believe 
that the blanket ban was minimally impairing, it was not the courts’ role to speculate whether an 
alternative was preferable.61  
 For the dissenters, however, the legislative scheme infringed s.7 by placing an arbitrary limit on the 
autonomy of individuals physically unable to end their lives;62 nor was that infringement justified 
under s.1, as the objective of eliminating abuse was already addressed by criminal law and could be 
supplemented by the condition of court authorisation.63 Moreover, s.241(b) discriminated against 
those physically disabled, limiting their capacity to make fundamental decisions about their lives 
based on an irrelevant personal characteristic; slippery slope concerns could not justify the over-reach 
of the ban, which went beyond the vulnerable and caught situations of free consent.64   
  
 
The Carter litigation [B heading; 12 bold]  
 
  MAiD became legal in Canada following the momentous Carter v Canada ruling in 2015, which 
reversed the Rodriguez position and held that s.241(b) deprived competent adults who suffered 
intolerably due to a grievous and irremediable medical condition of their constitutional rights under 
s.7 of the Charter.65 The right to life was found to be engaged whenever: “the law or state action 
 
55 Ibid at p588 (per Sopinka J). 
 
56 Ibid at p589. 
 
57 Ibid at p595. 
 
58 Ibid at p605. 
 
59 Ibid at pp 611-612. 
 
60 Ibid at pp 612-614. 
 
61 Ibid at pp 614-615. 
 
62 Ibid at pp 620-621 (per McLachlin J). 
 
63 Ibid at p617.  
 
64 Ibid at pp 549-569 (per Lamer CJ). 
 
65 [2015] 1 SCR 331. 
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imposes death or an increased risk of death on a person, either directly or indirectly”.66 The Supreme 
Court accepted that the blanket ban on MAiD amounted to indirect deprivation of life, insofar as: “it 
ha[d] the effect of forcing some individuals to take their own lives prematurely, for fear that they 
would be incapable of doing so when they reached the point where suffering was intolerable”.67 The 
rights to liberty and security of the person were also affected, as the prohibition raised concerns about 
autonomy and quality of life.68 An individual’s response to a grievous and irremediable medical 
condition was critical to their dignity and autonomy; the impugned prohibition denied them the right 
to make decisions concerning their bodily integrity and medical care, trenching on their liberty.69 
Moreover: “by leaving them to endure intolerable suffering, it impinge[d] on their security of the 
person”;70 this finding echoes the unsuccessful submission in Pretty that the assisted-dying ban 
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. 
 The court concluded that the prohibition infringed Charter rights in a manner inconsistent with the 
principles of fundamental justice. The ban achieved its objective, namely: “to protect vulnerable 
persons from being induced to commit suicide at a time of weakness”,71 and thus it did not deprive 
individuals arbitrarily of their rights.72 However, it caught people outside the class of intended 
protected persons and therefore was overbroad; the limitation placed on those individuals’ rights was 
not connected to the objective.73 Given this conclusion, the court found it unnecessary to decide 
whether the prohibition also violated the principle against gross disproportionality.74 Having 
ascertained a breach of s.7, the court also found it unnecessary to consider whether the prohibition 
deprived physically disabled persons of their right to equal treatment under s.15.75  
 The court further determined that the ban not was saved by s.1 of the Charter. Although it was 
prescribed by law, which had a: “pressing and substantial objective”,76 the limiting measure was not 
proportionate to the objective: 
 
[10 normal] [109] The trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in concluding, on the basis of evidence from 
scientists, medical practitioners, and others who are familiar with end-of-life decision-making in Canada and abroad, that 
a permissive regime with properly designed and administered safeguards was capable of protecting vulnerable people 
from abuse and error. 
 
The Supreme Court endorsed the trial judge’s finding that: “vulnerability can be assessed on an 
individual basis, using the procedures that physicians apply in their assessment of informed consent 
 
 
66 Ibid at [62]. 
 
67 Ibid at [57]. 
 
68 Ibid at [62]. 
 
69 Ibid at [64], [66], [68]. 
 
70 Ibid at [66]. 
 
71 Ibid at [75]-[78]. 
 
72 Ibid at [84]. 
 
73 Ibid at [85]-[88]. 
 
74 Ibid at [89]-[90]. 
 
75 Ibid at [93]. 
 
76 Ibid at [96]. 
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and decisional capacity in the context of medical decision-making more generally”.77 Consequently, 
the absolute prohibition was not minimally impairing.78 Having reached that conclusion, the court 
found it unnecessary to weigh the impact of the restriction on Charter rights against its beneficial 
effects for the greater public good.79  
 Without purporting to legislate, the Supreme Court provided several parameters for reform in 
wording the remedy afforded to the applicants: 
 
[10 normal] [127] The appropriate remedy is therefore a declaration that s. 241(b) and s. 14 of the Criminal Code are void 
insofar as they prohibit physician-assisted death for a competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination 
of life; and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that causes 
enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition.80 “Irremediable”, it 
should be added, does not require the patient to undertake treatments that are not acceptable to the individual.  
 
The court recognised the systemic nature of the offending law by issuing a declaration of invalidity, 
suspended for 12 months,81 rather than a free-standing constitutional exemption. 
 In January 2016, the federal government obtained a four-month extension of the suspension of 
invalidity to compensate for the interruption of legislative work between August and December 2015 
caused by federal elections.82 In Carter v Canada (No.2), the Supreme Court, while acknowledging 
the delay, made the order reluctantly:  
 
[10 normal] [2] To suspend a declaration of the constitutional invalidity of a law is an extraordinary step, since its effect 
is to maintain an unconstitutional law in breach of the constitutional rights of members of Canadian society. To extend 
such a suspension is even more problematic. The appellants point to the severe harm caused to individuals by an extension. 
 
The decision further granted Quebec’s request to be exempted from the suspension, having already 
adopted an Act Respecting End-of-Life Care under its concurrent health jurisdiction. The court saw 
no need: “to unfairly prolong the suffering of those who meet the clear [Carter] criteria”, and 
Quebec’s exemption: “[rose] concerns of fairness and equality across the country”; consequently, it 
permitted  those who wished to seek MAiD during the extension period to apply to the superior court 
of their jurisdiction for relief.83  
  
 
Parliament’s response [B heading; 12 bold]  
 
 The suspension gave Parliament an opportunity to amend the law to cure the incompatibility. The 
new s.241.2(1) of the Criminal Code allows MAiD if several conditions are cumulatively met: the 
patient is an adult entitled to health care services in Canada, s/he has a grievous and irremediable 
medical condition, made a voluntary request without external pressure, and gave informed consent to 
receiving MAiD after being advised of options to relieve suffering, including palliative care. The 
“grievous and irremediable medical condition” criterion is satisfied if the four factors in s.241.2(2) 
 
77 Ibid at [116]-[117]. 
 
78 Ibid at [121]. 
 
79 Ibid at [122]. 
 
80 Emphasis added. 
 
81 Ibid at [126]-[128]. 
 
82 Carter v Canada (AG) (No.2) [2016] 1 SCR 13. 
 
83 Ibid at [6].  
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are present: (a) the patient has a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability; (b) s/he is in an 
advanced state of irreversible decline in capability; (c) that illness, disease, disability or state of 
decline causes enduring physical or psychological suffering that is intolerable to the patient and 
cannot be relieved under conditions the patient considers acceptable; and (d) the patient’s natural 
death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all his/her medical circumstances, 
without a specific prognosis on how long s/he has left to live. Legal safeguards include two witnesses 
attesting to the patient’s written request, two medical opinions, a ten-day waiting period, and 
reiteration of consent immediately prior to receiving assistance.  
 By limiting eligibility to patients whose death is already foreseeable, Bill C-14 narrowed the 
categories granted access to MAiD when compared to Carter. A person such as the Re H.S. claimant, 
who refused to live her life sedated and semi-conscious to escape pain,84 qualified under the Carter 
criteria, but may be ineligible under s.241.2(2). Stewart aptly queried the constitutionality of 
s.241.2(2): by condemning persons who meet all criteria except “foreseeable death” to suffer 
indefinitely, the restriction is out of sync with the object of the law (allowing individuals to end 
permanent suffering) and hence grossly disproportionate.85 Interestingly, two lower-court rulings 
finding that “grievous and irremediable” in Carter did not mean “terminal”86 intervened as Bill C-14 
was progressing through Parliament, casting doubt on its constitutionality before it became law.87 
Nonetheless, Rahimi predicted that challenges to Bill C-14 would fail, relying on the finding in R v 
O’Connor88 and R v Mills89 that Parliament can alter common-law standards established in 
declarations of invalidity as long as its approach remains constitutional; Bill C-14’s reconciliation of 
s.7 rights with the protection of the vulnerable, albeit not identical to that in Carter, could be seen as 
a permissible balancing act.90 
 Unsurprisingly, constitutional challenges to the new MAiD regulation, in particular Lamb and 
Truchon, have already targeted s.241.2(2)(d).91 In Lamb, expert evidence before the British Colombia 
Court showed the expansive interpretation given by doctors to the “reasonably foreseeable” 
requirement, encompassing cases of refusal of life-prolonging care, and the applicant, who seemingly 
qualified, requested that the case be adjourned.92 However, in Truchon, the Quebec Superior Court 
 
 
84 See Re H.S. [2016] ABQB 121 at [116]: “It is not acceptable to me to live sedated to the point of unconsciousness until 
I choke on my own bodily fluids.” 
 
85 See Stewart (2018) ‘Constitutional aspects of Canada’s new medically-assisted dying law’ in Ross (ed), Assisted death: 
legal, social and ethical issues after Carter 435 at pp 453-455. 
 
86 Canada (AG) v E.F. [2016] ABCA 155 (Court of Appeal of Alberta) and I.J. v Canada (AG) [2016] ONSC 3380 
(Ontario Superior Court of Justice). 
 
87 See Nicolaides and Hennigar (2018) ‘Carter Conflicts: The Supreme Court of Canada’s impact on medical assistance 
in dying policy’ p320 in Macfarlane (ed) Policy change, courts and the Canadian Constitution. 
 
88 [1995] 4 SCT 411. 
 
89 [1999] 3 SCR 668. 
 
90 Rahimi (2017) ‘Assisted death in Canada: An exploration of the constitutionality of Bill C-14’ Saskatchewan LR 457 
at p480. Justifying the cautious federal response to Carter, see Lemmens et al (2017) ‘Why Canada’s medical assistance 
in dying legislation should be C(h)arter compliant and what it may help to avoid’ McGill JL & Health S61. 
 
91 Lamb v Canada (AG) 2017 BCSC 1802; Truchon c. Procureur général du Canada 2019 QCCS 3792. See McMorrow 
(2018) ‘MAID in Canada? Debating the constitutionality of Canada’s new medical assistance in dying law’ Queen’s LJ 
69 at pp 81-87. 
 
92 See https://bccla.org/news/2019/09/release-b-c-supreme-court-adjourns-b-c-civil-liberties-associations-assisted-
dying-case/; Downie (2019) ‘Two major legal developments in the space of a week on Canada’s medical assistance in 
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ruled s.241.2(2)(d) invalid.93 It suspended the invalidity for six months to allow provincial and federal 
legislators to amend the law, while affording the applicants constitutional exemptions. The Supreme 
Court will not have an opportunity to express its views, as the federal and Quebec governments 
decided not to appeal,94 a choice criticised as allowing one judge excessive power to undo what 
Parliament deemed best for society.95 The Quebec Superior Court agreed to extend the deadline to 
July 11, 2020.96 A further five-month extension of the suspension was requested by the federal 
government in June 2020, due to the Covid-19 pandemic’s disruption of parliamentary proceedings.97 
 An amendment of federal legislation, as opposed to the inapplicability of s.241.2(2)(d) in Quebec, 
would achieve legal certainty and a uniform MAiD regime in all provinces. The repeal of 
s.241.2(2)(d) would bring Canada’s law closer to more liberal MAiD statutes, such as the Belgian 
and Dutch ones,98 which include those suffering intolerably from long-term, but not fatal, conditions; 
that category might arguably benefit the most from choosing the time of their death. O’Reilly and 
Hogeboom highlight further controversial restrictions in Canadian law when compared to other 
jurisdictions: the absence of provision for advance directives for individuals likely to lose their ability 
to consent in the near future,99 the ineligibility of mature minors100 and persons complaining of acute 
mental rather than physical suffering.101 von Tigerstrom argued that the failure to provide for advance 
consent to MAiD (by contrast with the option of advance directives to withdraw/ withhold life-saving 
treatment) might be overbroad, since it condemns some individuals to intolerable suffering without 
justification, and might violate the right to life, as individuals who risk losing competence or capacity 
to communicate are pressurised into premature suicide.102 Intrinsically inconsistent end-of-life 
 
dying laws could help more Canadians end their suffering’ Policy Options, 
https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/september-2019/a-watershed-month-for-medical-assistance-in-dying/.  
 






95 See Lemmens and Jacobs, ‘The latest medical assistance in dying decision needs to be appealed: Here’s why’, The 
Conversation (October 24, 2019), https://theconversation.com/the-latest-medical-assistance-in-dying-decision-needs-to-
be-appealed-heres-why-124955. 
 
96 See https://globalnews.ca/news/6618538/quebec-ottawa-four-months-assisted-dying-law/. 
 
97 See https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/maid-assisted-dying-lametti-1.5607681. 
 
98 See Luzon (2019) ‘The practice of euthanasia and assisted suicide meets the concept of legalization’ Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 329 at pp 329-331; Jackson (2012) ‘In favour of the legalisation of assisted dying’ pp 62-66 in Jackson and 
Keown (eds) Debating euthanasia 1 at pp 62-66; Mishara and Weisstub (2013) ‘Premises and evidence in the rhetoric of 
assisted suicide and euthanasia’ International JL & Psychiatry 427; Hillyard and Dombrink (2001) Dying right: The death 
with dignity movement pp 211-234; Cormack (2000) ‘Euthanasia and assisted suicide in the post-Rodriguez era: Lessons 
from foreign jurisdictions’ Osgoode Hall LJ 591. 
 
99 On advance directives, see du Bois-Pedain (2007) ‘Is there a human right to die’ pp 78-81 in Brooks-Gordon et al. (eds) 
Death rites and rights. The main objection is that incompetent patients having made decisions based on value judgments 
might enjoy unanticipated experiences (ibid at p80).  
 
100 See MacIntosh (2016) ‘Carter, medical aid in dying, and mature minors’ McGill JL & Health S1, arguing that the 
exclusion of mature minors from the MAiD regime violates the Charter. 
 
101 O’Reilly and Hogeboom (2017) ‘The framing and implementation of law: Assisted death in Canada’ Journal of 
Parliamentary and Political Law 699 at pp 711-714.  
 
102 von Tigerstrom (2015) ‘Consenting to physician-assisted death: Issues arising from Carter v. Canada (Attorney 
General)’ Saskatchewan LR 233. 
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legislation (permitting advance directives in respect of life-support withdrawal, but not MAiD) may 
affect fundamental rights disproportionately.103 Some of these objections emerged before the 




Applying the Carter criteria to requests for individual constitutional exemption [B heading; 12 bold] 
 
 During the period of extension of the suspension of invalidity following Carter (No.2), Canadian 
courts have addressed questions of capacity to consent, vulnerability and indirect coercion in several 
cases.  
 In H.S. v Canada, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench extracted five criteria from para.127 of Carter, 
also endorsed by the Superior Court of Ontario’s 2016 decision in A.B. v Canada: (1) the person 
seeking authorisation is a competent adult, (2) s/he has a grievous and irremediable medical condition, 
(3) the condition is causing intolerable suffering, (4) the suffering cannot be alleviated by any 
treatment s/he finds acceptable and (5) s/he clearly consents to the termination of life.104 The Superior 
Court of Ontario further defined “grievous medical condition” as a condition that greatly interferes 
with that person’s quality of life.105 Importantly, in E.F., the Alberta Court of Appeal clarified that 
the constitutional exemption granted in Carter (No.2) does not require the person’s medical condition 
to be terminal.106  
 The O.P. v Canada ruling rejected the argument that, after the expiration of the suspension of 
invalidity, physician-assisted dying had become permissible without court order even if Parliament 
had failed to legislate; the rule of law and the protection of the vulnerable required judicial oversight 
until a legislative response was available.107 
 
 
Applying the amended Criminal Code [B heading; 12 bold] 
 
 Remarkably, the new law does not require judicial intervention. As noted by the Superior Court of 




103 See mutatis mutandis Costa and Pavan v Italy (54270/10, 28 August 2012); legislation prohibiting embryo pre-
implantation diagnosis for sufferers of cystic fibrosis, whilst permitting abortion if the foetus had that condition, violated 
Art 8 ECHR. 
 
104 Re H.S. [2016] ABQB 121 at [94]; A.B. v Canada (AG) [2016] ONSC 1912 at [22]. See further [2016] ONSC 1912 at 
[23]-[28], discussing these criteria. 
 
105 [2016] ONSC 1912 at [25]. See also I.J. v Canada (AG) [2016] ONSC 3380.  
 
106 Canada (AG) v E.F. [2016] ABCA 155. Before Bill C-14 was adopted, consensus that terminal illness should not be 
an access criterion was evidenced by reports of the Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on Physician Assisted 
Dying (http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/news/bulletin/2015/docs/eagreport_20151214_en.pdf) and Special Joint 
Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying, a federal parliamentary body 
(https://www.documentdoud.org/documents/2721231-Report-of-the-Special-Joint-Committee). See Schuklenk (2016) 
‘Canada on course to introduce permissive assisted dying regime’ Journal of Medical Ethics 490 at p491. 
 
107 O.P. v Canada (AG) [2016] ONSC 3956. 
 
108 A.B. v Canada (AG) 2017 ONSC 3759. In the UK, the Supreme Court has shifted the decision-making process 
regarding the withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration from patients in a persistent vegetative state from 
courts to medical professionals; see NHS Trust v Y and Another [2018] UKSC 46. 
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[10 normal] [62] Bill C-14’s legislative history (and its language) demonstrates Parliament’s intention that the physicians 
and nurse practitioners who have been asked to provide medical assistance in dying are exclusively responsible for 
deciding whether the Code’s criteria are satisfied without any pre-authorization from the courts.   
 
This solution followed the 2015 report of the Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on 
Physician-Assisted Dying.109 Criticising its recommendations, Chan and Sommerville noted that 
judicial authorisation of MAiD was seen as an essential safeguard by Lord Neuberger in Nicklinson 
and McLachlin J in her dissent in Rodriguez, as well as by the Carter (No.2) interim regime of 
individual exemptions, and failing to generalise it in the permanent regulatory regime was 
unjustified.110  
 The A.B. ruling also clarified the meaning of “reasonably foreseeable death” in s.241.2(2)(d), noting 
that an elderly person: “in an advanced state of incurable, irreversible, worsening illness with 
excruciating pain and no quality of life” was eligible for assistance.111 It also emphasised that the 
natural death referred to in the Criminal Code: “need not be connected to a particular terminal disease 
or condition and rather is connected to all of a particular person’s medical circumstances”.112 In 
addition, it explained the role of the courts under the amended legislation: whilst they may neither 
decide for the doctors if a patient qualifies nor pre-determine criminal liability and interfere with 
prosecutorial discretion, they can nevertheless interpret civil law;113 this interpretative role was 
particularly important given the novelty of, and public interest in, the assisted-dying regime and the 
gravity of the issues at stake.114 
 
 
III. Principled concerns: inviolability-of-life vs self-determination 
[A heading; 14 bold] 
 
 The starting point of judicial deliberations over legalising MAiD was, in both jurisdictions, whether 
the law should be subordinated to grand moral principles like sanctity of life or embrace moral 
neutrality, whilst protecting the vulnerable. Admittedly, the abrogation of the crime of suicide did not 
establish the law’s preference for self-determination over sanctity of life. Finnis argued that, although 
some British judges saw decriminalisation of suicide as a shift towards autonomy, its objective, found 
in s.2(1)’s legislative history, lay elsewhere: the offence was not an effective deterrent, it cast 
unwarranted stigma on the deceased’s family, and led to the prosecution of patients recovering from 
suicide attempts.115 Sopinka J, delivering the majority judgment in Rodriguez, similarly viewed 
decriminalisation of suicide in Canada as recognising the non-legal roots and solutions of suicide, 
rather than as evidence of consensus on the prevalence of autonomy.116 However, medical law in both 
 
109 Cit fn 106. 
 
110 Chan and Sommerville (2016) ‘Converting the “right to life” to the “right to physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia”: 
An analysis of Carter v Canada (Attorney-General), Supreme Court of Canada’ Medical LR 143 at pp 172-173, citing 
[2014] UKSC 38 at [108] and [1993] 3 SCR 519 at p627. 
 
111 [2017] ONSC 3759 at [87]. 
 
112 Ibid at [81]. 
 
113 Ibid at [63]-[67]. 
 
114 Ibid at [73]. 
 
115 See Finnis (2015) ‘A British “Convention right” to Assistance in Suicide?’ LQR 1 at p5; Pretty [2001] UKHL 61 at 
[35]. 
 
116 [1993] 3 SCR 519 at pp 597-598. 
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countries unquestionably indicates that society cannot impose the sanctity-of-life belief on 
individuals over their autonomy rights. 
 
 
Autonomy and compassion in medical law: refusal of life support, children’s medical treatment 
and involuntary euthanasia for incompetent adults [B heading; 12 bold] 
 
 English common law recognises, as vividly captured by Lord Goff in Bland, that: “the principle of 
the sanctity of human life must yield to the principle of self-determination”.117 Competent patients 
have an absolute right to refuse life-saving treatment. They can do so for irrational reasons or no 
reasons at all.118 Continuing to provide life-sustaining treatment to patients against their wishes is 
also unlawful.119 Additionally, incompetent patients are entitled to the respect of advance refusal of 
treatment expressed while they were competent.120 Through the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 
Parliament: “has afforded a framework wherein persons in situations far less dire than those of Mr 
Lamb and Mr Nicklinson can choose to end their lives”.121 Attempts to justify s.2(1) SA by reference 
to the absolute inviolability of life would be incongruous. 
 Canadian case-law has also established that patients have a right to refuse life-saving treatment.122 
Courts: “have rejected a vitalist or ‘life-at-any-cost’ philosophy, and have accepted the legal option 
of mentally competent free individuals to risk preventable death rather than be compelled to live 
under conditions they find objectionable”.123 Medical law requires physicians to respect patients’ 
decision to request removal of life support (eg feeding tube, respirator or dialysis) even where they 
do not deem it in the patients’ best interests.124 As summarised in Rodriguez:  
 
[10 normal] To impose medical treatment on one who refuses it constitutes battery and our common law has recognized 
the right to demand that medical treatment which would extend life be withheld or withdrawn.125 
 
 Using inviolability-of-life arguments to reject assisted-dying claims is also inconsistent with the 
law’s approach to withdrawal of life support from children with extreme medical conditions. In 
Charlie Gard126 and Alfie Evans,127 authorising hospitals to discontinue treatment against the parents’ 
 
117 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p864. 
 
118 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95. 
 
119 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam). 
 
120 See Michalowski (2005) ‘Advance refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment: The relativity of an absolute right’ 
Modern LR 958. 
 
121 Coggon (2017) ‘Judgment 2 – R (on the Application of Nicklinson and Another) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 
38’ p213 in Smith et al (eds) Ethical judgments. Rewriting medical law. 
 
122 See British Columbia (AG) v Astaforoff [1984] 6 WWR 385; Malette v Schulman [1990] 72 OR (2d) 417; Nancy B v 
Hôtel-Dieu de Québec [1992] RJQ 361. 
 
123 Dickens (1993) ‘Medically assisted death: Nancy B v. Hôtel-Dieu de Québec’ McGill LJ 1053 at p1065. 
 
124 Schafer (2013) ‘Physician assisted suicide: The great Canadian euthanasia debate’ International JL&Psychiatry 522 
at p526. 
 
125 [1993] 3 SCR 519 at p588. On the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment see du Bois-Pedain op cit fn 99 at p77. 
 
126 See https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/charlie-gard-190617.pdf, refusing permission to appeal Great Ormond 
Street Hospital v Yates, Gard and Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410. The ECtHR endorsed the decision; see Gard v UK (2017) 
65 EHRR SE9. 
 
 16 
wishes, the UK’s Supreme Court implicitly recognised that there is a minimum quality of life below 
which it is not in the child’s best interests to continue living. In Charlie Gard, it also accepted that 
prolonging the child’s suffering without realistic prospects of improvement exposed him to 
significant harm. Alfie Evans went further: “it is not lawful for [doctors] to give treatment to [a child] 
which is not in his interests” even if continued treatment does not cause significant harm.128 
Strikingly, parents, doctors and courts can decide whether the life awaiting sick children is worth 
living; indeed, courts can authorise termination of treatment even if parents view life support in their 
child’s best interests. If third parties can decide for minor patients when illness reduces their quality 
of life to unacceptable levels, it appears irrational to prevent competent adults from deciding where 
that threshold lies for themselves. 
 Re A (Conjoined Twins)129 casts further doubt on law’s absolute belief in the inviolability of human 
life. The compromise here was even greater: the hastened death of the weaker twin as a result of 
surgical separation aimed to secure the best interests of her sister (whose death was avoidable), not 
her own. For Lewis, the uniqueness of the case did not make it an authority for a defence of necessity 
in euthanasia cases; the death was inevitable and the act hastening it achieved net saving of life by 
avoiding another person’s death.130 However, if hastening death is exceptionally accepted as ‘the 
lesser evil’, and without the patient’s consent, surely the patient ought to be permitted a similar 
judgment call for their person. 
 The law’s approach to involuntary euthanasia for incompetent adults also undermines the 
inviolability-of-life justification for the ban on MAiD. In Bland, a case concerning an adult in 
permanent vegetative state (PVS), the court accepted that there is a threshold below which merely 
being alive procures individuals no participation in, or enjoyment of, life.131 If the law allows 
compassionate termination of life at the request of third parties (family/ doctors), a fortiori competent 
patients should be able to decide where they draw the line between a life worth living and one offering 
no gratification. As Lord Neuberger observed in Nicklinson, withdrawal of life support from another 
is: “a more drastic interference in that person’s life and a more extreme moral step” than authorising 
the assistance in dying sought by the patient.132  
 PVS patients’ right to die is based on the assumption that they would refuse the indignities to which 
the deterioration of their bodies subjects them, albeit unconscious and unperturbed by them. 
Paradoxically, lucid individuals trapped in decaying bodies, capable of expressing their wish to die, 
are left to endure, powerless, those indignities. Equally ironic is another judicial inconsistency:  given 
the intense “anguish of awaiting execution”, exposing convicts to the ‘death-row phenomenon’ was 
recognised as psychological ill-treatment;133 forcing patients to live with the spectre of a painful and 
undignified death was not deemed such.  
 
127 See https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/alfie-evans-reasons-200318.pdf, refusing permission to appeal Evans 
and James v Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust, Alfie Evans [2018] EWCA 984 (Civ). 
 
128 Ibid at [16]. 
 
129 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001] Fam 147. 
 
130 Lewis (2013) ‘The failure of the defence of necessity as a mechanism of legal change on assisted dying in the common 
law world’ pp 284-285 in Baker and Horder, The sanctity of life and the criminal law. 
 
131 [1993] AC 789. See Price (2009) ‘What shape to euthanasia after Bland? Historical, contemporary and futuristic 
paradigms’ LQR 142; Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001) Human dignity in bioethics and biolaw pp 244-254. 
 
132 [2015] AC 657 at [94]. For a comparative survey of case-law on refusal of life-saving treatment, parents’ right to 
refuse treatment for children and guardians’ decision-making powers for comatose adults, see Gorsuch (2006) The future 
of assisted suicide and euthanasia pp 181-215. On the distinction active/ passive euthanasia, ie killing/ letting the patient 
die (eg injecting lethal substances versus withholding life-saving treatment), see Luzon, op cit fn 98 at p333. 
 





The relative ‘absoluteness’ of the right to life [B heading; 12 bold] 
 
 A rights-based version of inviolability-of-life arguments invokes the absolute nature of the right to 
life under Art 2 ECHR. According to Finnis: “[s]uch absoluteness not only eliminates margin of 
appreciation but entails obligations to avoid creating any ‘real risk’ of violation by anyone”.134 This 
claim is unsupported by the text of Art 2 or its jurisprudential interpretation. By contrast with the 
unqualified prohibition of ill-treatment (Art 3) or slavery (Art 4(1)), Art 2(2) permits intentional 
deprivation of life and potentially lethal use of force (eg to defend innocents against third-party 
violence) as long as they are “no more than necessary”. Torturing criminals in a ‘ticking bomb’ 
scenario is unlawful;135 killing terrorists as a last-resort law-enforcement measure is not.136 Absolute 
rights do not permit interferences, and the right enshrined in Art 2 does. Outside the human-rights 
context, Battin noted that: “the intrinsic-wrongness-of-killing argument falls to its counterexamples 
of war and self-defence without adequate rebuttal”.137  
 Moreover, an individual has the right to life, not the obligation to exercise it; nor are States expected 
to compel individuals to exercise this right, much like the right to vote (Protocol 1 Art 3) does not 
oblige citizens to vote and does not require States to prevent electoral absenteeism. Finnis’s 
suggestion that States must protect life against violation by anyone, including oneself, only applies, 
according to Strasbourg case-law, to the narrow situation of individuals afflicted by mental disorders 
that include suicidal behaviour, where a limited duty of care arises. Keenan v UK established a mere 
obligation of conduct, not of result, for prison authorities in respect of mentally-ill inmates, ie to take 
reasonable precautions to prevent suicide.138 Importantly, in such cases, as Wicks noted, the duty to 
treat suicide as a risk to prevent, rather than as a choice to respect, stems from the fact that mental 
disorder may preclude autonomous choices.139 More clearly dispositive of the issue, Lambert v 
France found legislation permitting end-of-life decisions ECHR-compliant.140 It is also a well-
established principle that the ECHR: “must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to 
promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions”.141 Art 2 cannot be 
interpreted as requiring States to coerce patients into receiving life-saving treatment, as this would 
clash with Art 8 obligations to protect physical self-determination and Art 9 respect for freedom of 
conscience; for that same reason, it cannot be seen as requiring States to force individuals to stay 
alive.  
 Coggon argued that a “high-sounding moral principle” like the sanctity of life cannot justify 
restrictions on individual rights, and their rationale may only lie in the “rights of others”.142 This is 
 
134 Finnis, op cit fn 115 at p6 (original emphasis). 
 
135 See Gäfgen v Germany (2011) 52 EHRR 1; Bjorge (2011) ‘Torture and “ticking bomb” scenarios’ LQR 196 at p199. 
 
136 See McCann and Others v UK (1995) 21 EHRR 97. 
 
137 Battin (2005) Ending life: Ethics and the way we die p39. 
 
138 See Keenan v UK (2001) 33 EHRR 903. 
 
139 Wicks, op cit fn 6 at p78.  
 
140 Lambert v France (2016) 62 EHRR 2.   
 
141 Stec v UK 43 EHRR 1027 at [48]; Saadi v UK (2007) 44 EHRR 50 at [62]; Hirsi Jamaaa v Italy (2012) 55 EHRR 21 
at [171]; Demir and Baykara v Turkey (2009) 48 EHRR 54 at [66]. 
 
142 Coggon, op cit fn 121 at p211. On the inviolability-of-life principle see Keown (2012) The law and ethics of medicine: 
Essays on the inviolability of human life pp 3-22.  
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particularly true of bans affecting bodily self-determination. To ground s.2(1) SA in a collective 
philosophical belief is tantamount to saying that patients like Mrs Pretty are compelled to endure 
death by suffocation because society (rectius, the majority) sees it preferable to hastened pain-free 
death. As Dworkin wrote: “Making someone die in a way that others approve, but he believes a 
horrifying contradiction of his life, is a devastating, odious form of tyranny”.143 
 
 
The moral neutrality of assisted-dying legislation [B heading; 12 bold] 
 
 British and Canadian highest courts have accepted that self-determination encompasses a right not 
to believe in the prevalence of sanctity-of-life considerations over dignity in dying144 and avoiding 
incurable suffering. In the UK, post-Pretty case-law rejected the sanctity-of-life justification for the 
ban, seen in competition with the principles of individual autonomy and human dignity.145 In 
Rodriguez, the Canadian Supreme Court conceded that sanctity of life (understood in the secular 
sense that human life has intrinsic value), albeit a deeply rooted belief in society, does not prevail 
over liberty and security of the person; rather, it is: “one of the values engaged” in MAiD 
deliberations.146 Nothing in the case-law suggests that the legalisation of MAiD sanctions any 
particular view on the value of life; the debate largely revolved around the risks of accommodating 
private opinion on human intervention with the natural course of life and death.147  
 Nicklinson accepted the moral neutrality of assisted-dying legislation and adduced practical concerns 
about shielding the vulnerable from abuse. Papadopoulou thus noted a change in judicial attitudes 
since the robust support for the prohibition in Pretty: “judges are now dealing not with whether the 
law should change, but with how the law could change”.148 However, Conway marked a conservative 
retreat from that stance. The High Court reopened the sanctity-of-life debate and found that this 
principle could justify interferences with private life, being subsumed under the “protection of 
morals” permitted by Art 8(2) ECHR.149 The court warned against downplaying the sanctity-of-life 
principle where a person has six months left to live (Mr Conway’s proposed threshold criterion for 
assisted dying).150 The Court of Appeal also placed sanctity of life on an equal footing with other 
legitimate justifications (protecting the vulnerable, promoting trust between patients and doctors),151 
even if the judgement, like Nicklinson and Carter, focused on pragmatic ‘slippery slope’ arguments. 
 
143 Dworkin (1993) Life’s dominion: An argument about abortion and euthanasia p217.   
 
144 According to Velleman (2015) Beyond Price: Essays on birth and death p33 the phrase ‘dying with dignity’ is 
misleading, as “[t]he operative concept is undignified life, not dignified death”. However, both might be at stake: life in 
distressing circumstances and the foreseeable manner of death.  
      
145 See Nicklinson (fn 1) at [199], [209], [358]. 
 
146 [1993] 3 SCR 519 at pp 585-586. 
 
147 See also Heywood (2010) ‘R. (on the application of Purdy) v DPP: clarification on assisted suicide’ LQR 5 at p6: 
“Individuals may attach greater importance to certain lifestyle characteristics than others and that is their choice, in the 
same way that those who value the sanctity of life above all else make a conscious decision to do so. It is impossible to 
say either belief is right or wrong for the very reason that they are matters of private opinion”. 
 
148 Papadopoulou (2017) ‘From Pretty to Nicklinson: changing judicial attitudes to assisted dying’ European Human 
Rights LR 298 at p307. 
 
149 [2018] EWCA Civ 1431at [47]. 
 
150 Ibid at [33] - [34]. 
 
151 Ibid at [61], [204]. 
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Ethical concerns were revived in Newby, according to which: “the court is not an appropriate forum 
for the discussion of the sanctity of life”.152 
 The moral neutrality of MAiD legislation, whereby States merely defer to individual moral beliefs, 
remains highly contested. Foster labelled MAiD “government-endorsed suicide”.153 White noted that, 
while the Carter plaintiffs invoked human dignity to claim end-of-life choice, intervening disability-
advocate groups also relied on dignity to suggest that removing the ban would send the message that 
life with significant impairment is not worth living.154 Such submissions overlook the fact that MAiD 
initiatives proceeded from disabled individuals, not the State, and the change they pursued was not 
the State’s evaluation of what makes a life worth living, but everyone’s right to make that subjective 
judgment for their person.  
 Similarly, in Conway, the Court of Appeal suggested that, to decide on the ban’s proportionality, 
advances in palliative care to manage distressful symptoms had to be considered,155 which underrated 
patients’ subjective assessment of what constitutes satisfactory treatment. More sensibly, the new 
Canadian law takes palliative care options into account when assessing MAiD eligibility, not as a 
justification for a blanket ban. Significantly, under s.241.2(2) of the Criminal Code, the care available 
must be acceptable to the patient. Whether or not the treatment offers relief without excessively 
diminishing the patient’s quality of life cannot be objectively determined by doctors or courts.      
   
 
Killing and letting die: the elusive distinction [B heading; 12 bold] 
 
 Sanctity-of-life reasoning also underpins the alleged moral distinction between acts and omissions. 
Its supporters condemn acts causing death (complicity in suicide), but condone fatal omissions 
(discontinuing life-sustaining treatment).156 This distinction is largely artificial; in both cases, 
motivation (compassionate, ie relieve suffering), intention (implement patients’ decision) and 
foreseeable consequence (patients’ death) are identical.157 For Cohn and Lynn, withdrawal of support 
is different from assisted dying because doctors’ intent is to respect patients’ wishes not to receive 
undesired treatment;158 however, physicians providing MAiD are equally animated by the intention 
to respect patients’ wishes, not to bring about their death. Doctors/ relatives offering assistance in 
dying have no autonomous intention to end life, they are instrumental to patients’ decision, enabling 
them to exercise control over their body. In terms of moral responsibility for the death, the distinction 
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between foresight (disconnecting ventilation with the knowledge that the patient will die) and 
intention (administering drugs that will cause the patient to die) is also tenuous.159  
 Even categorising conduct as (positive) act or (passive) omission is not straightforward. To 
differentiate between disconnecting the feeding tube and not supplying nutrients down the tube would 
be spurious.160 Moreover, to classify the active removal of ventilatory support as withholding 
treatment (an omission) is semantically problematic, although admittedly it is possible to let die (of 
natural causes) through an act (terminating medical assistance).161 In Re A, the Court of Appeal 
rejected the lower court’s finding that surgical separation of conjoined twins, depriving the weaker 
one of vital sustenance, was akin to withdrawal of support, and hence an omission.162 It is also worth 
noting that the law does not treat the rejection of life-sustaining treatment as suicide (otherwise 
doctors withdrawing life support would be liable of assistance in suicide), but the distinction between 
refusal of treatment and self-starvation, which does constitute suicide, is feeble.163 
 Notwithstanding the flaws of the act/omission theory, respondent governments in right-to-die 
litigation have attempted to distinguish MAiD on this basis from withdrawal/ non-provision of life-
saving treatment. Both Supreme Courts received the argument with scepticism. They accepted that 
medical law prioritises self-determination over preservation of life as an absolute objective, and if a 
person cannot be coerced into treatment to save their life, the same autonomy should be recognised 
in relation to assisted dying. The two courts differed on whether curtailing self-determination rights 
was justified in order to protect the rights of others.  
 In Conway, however, the UK’s Court of Appeal rationalised the law’s permissive approach to 
withdrawal of treatment by distinguishing “an act or omission which allows causes already present 
in the body to operate” from “the introduction of an external agency of death”.164 This dichotomy is 
equally unconvincing. Both allowing the disease to kill and introducing death-hasting substances 
result in the patient’s death, and do so with foreknowledge, the moral authorship of the decision rests 
with the patient, and the motivation of those implementing it is compassionate. Worryingly, the 
Conway justification gives credence to the ethics of ‘allowing nature to follow its course’; suffice it 
to recall the infamous US cases involving ‘faith healing’ families, where parents refused to administer 
medication to their children for religious reasons, and children died from treatable illnesses.165 They, 
too, allowed natural causes present in the body to follow their course; applying the Conway test, since 
parents introduced no external cause of death, their conduct was morally virtuous and legally 
acceptable. Kuhse and Singer highlighted the absurd consequences of the argument that letting die of 
natural causes is morally distinct from compassionate killing: if starving an infant to death or failing 
to treat a preventable infection merely allows nature to take its course, parents could ensure the death 
of unwanted children without being responsible for it.166 They also criticised the oversimplification 
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behind the conclusion that, when doctors refrain from treating patients, the latter’s death is caused by 
nature: “Both the illness and the omission are part of the ‘sum total of the conditions positive and 
negative taken together’ which is the full causal account of the death”.167   
  
 
Assisted-dying bans: the fundamental rights engaged [B heading; 12 bold] 
 
The same substantive debate led to a different conceptualisation of the rights engaged in Canada and 
the UK. Both countries recognise an individual entitlement to end-of-life convictions and decisions. 
However, autonomy, specifically bodily self-determination, is seen as a matter of privacy under Art 
8 ECHR, whereas for the Canadian Charter it engages the right to liberty and personal security. There 
is, of course, no textually explicit ‘privacy’ right in the Charter; as in the United States, effective 
recognition of a privacy right in Canadian law has been extracted from other textual sources.168 The 
UK’s acceptance of end-of-life decision-making as part of privacy rights was relatively recent and 
driven by the ECtHR. In Canada, the impetus for recognition of self-determination vis-à-vis the time 
and manner of one’s death was purely domestic and dates back to Rodriguez, which preceded Pretty 
v UK by a decade.  
 Although euthanasia and assisted suicide are often used co-terminously, both Nicklinson/ Conway 
and Carter drew an important agency-based distinction: assisted suicide does not involve deciding 
about a third-party’s life; rather, it means empowering competent adults who, due to devastating 
disabilities, cannot implement their own decisions over their bodies.169 Criticising Carter, Keown 
suggested that, if assistance to die benefits patients who suffer, the logical consequence is that it 
should be available to those who are mentally incompetent, because the duty of beneficence applies 
even where patients cannot consent.170 This reductio ad absurdum seems based on a questionable 
interpretation of beneficence as an objective standard in situations of intractable suffering, 
whereas individual responses differ, and what makes compassionate assistance morally/ legally 
permissible is the patient’s own determination that assistance benefits them. Whether death is 
beneficial or harmful will depend on each patient’s perception of their circumstances.171 As recently 
recalled in a Court of Protection case, when deciding on life-sustaining treatment for incapacitous 
persons, their “best interests” under s.4 Mental Capacity Act 2005 depend on their ascertainable 
wishes, values and beliefs; the presumption in favour of prolongation of life is not absolute.172 The 
judge’s reflections on respect for personal autonomy in the face of severe illness, eroding quality of 
life, self-esteem and interpersonal relationships, could apply to MAiD requests as much as to advance 
directives on treatment:  
 
 
167 Ibid at p50. 
 
168 See the discussions in the chapters by Beattie and Phillipson (pp --- below); Hatzis (pp --- below); and Taylor (pp --- 
below). On the various foundations of constitutional challenges to the criminalisation of MAiD in Canada, the UK and 
the US see Lewis (2007) Assisted dying and legal change pp 12-42.  
 
169 Some distinguish between “doctor-assisted suicide” (patient’s self-administration of lethal drugs supplied by the 
doctor) and “voluntary euthanasia” (drugs administered by the doctor at patient’s request); see Otlowski (1997) Voluntary 
euthanasia and the common law pp 7-9. This chapter’s reference to “assisted dying” covers all assistance given to 
competent patients at their request to enable them to control the time and manner of their death (provision and/or 
administration of drugs, assistance to travel to clinics lawfully offering MAiD). 
 
170 See Keown (2018) ‘Carter: A stain on Canadian jurisprudence?’ p16 in Ross, op cit fn 85. 
 
171 See also Smith, op cit fn 159 at p127.  
 
172 Barnsley Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v MSP [2020] EWCOP 26 at [20]-[28], citing Aintree University Hospital 




[47] He has made a practical, utilitarian calculation that life in these circumstances is not what he wants. … this is not a 
case about choosing to die, it is about an adult’s capacity to shape and control the end of his life. This is an important 
facet of personal autonomy … . 
 
 In addition to self-determination, the right to life featured prominently in Carter and was 
unsuccessfully invoked in Conway. Whilst the Nicklinson pleas came from individuals who could not 
end their lives unassisted, Carter regarded patients whose ability to end their lives was likely to be 
impaired in the near future and who felt pressurised into doing so prematurely. The Canadian 
Supreme Court agreed that this interfered with their right to life. Whilst Art 2 ECHR submissions 
were not before the Nicklinson court, the concern was expressed in Lord Neuberger’s judgment: by 
forcing sufferers of degenerative diseases to die while they are still able to do so unassisted, the 
impugned prohibition “indirectly cuts short their lives”.173 Huxtable recalled cases where “this legal 
obstacle has prompted some patients to act alone, while they still could …, one of whom made legal 
history after she suffocated herself with a plastic bag”.174  
  Submissions based on the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment regrettably failed in 
English courts. As Mullock argued, the law should balance the protection of the vulnerable against 
the “‘cruelty’ of those unwillingly trapped in life to live on”.175 Even in Canada, the law is yet to fully 
recognise, under the right to protection against cruel treatment, a moral imperative to end human 
suffering upon request. Albeit not requiring terminal illness or a specified prognosis, Bill C-14 
reserved eligibility for assistance to cases of reasonably foreseeable death; further reform is, however, 
expected after Truchon. The latest British Assisted Dying Bill also excluded individuals who are not 
terminally ill but who suffer from constant pain, with no acceptable palliative care available, and are 
dependent on others in ways they consider undignified.176 Such patients arguably have an even greater 
need to control the timing of their death; prompting this category to seek disturbing alternatives to 
MAiD appears irrational. Moreover, since patients can request withdrawal of treatment to passively 
hasten death without being terminally ill, no sound justification exists for making it a pre-condition 
for requests to actively hasten death.177  
 A related concern, underexplored in litigation but dramatically manifest after the defeat of autonomy 
claims in Nicklinson, is the type of death available in the absence of medical assistance. After losing 
his High Court battle, Mr Nicklinson embarked upon self-starvation, shortened by pneumonia; Martin 
engaged in an aborted attempt at self-starvation after the Hight Court judgment.178 The blanket ban 
on MAiD forces competent adults having reached a settled decision to end their lives due to constant 
suffering to resort to agonising suicide methods (sometimes botched attempts, leaving them worse 
off) instead of a controlled medical procedure. Jackson argued that everyone is entitled to experience 
a ‘good death’, which may require assistance in dying, and that in a secular society, recognising 
different moral views, individuals should not be compelled to deaths they find intolerable.179 Lord 
 
173 [2015] AC 657 at [96]. 
 
174 Huxtable, op cit fn 156 at p58. 
 
175 Mullock (2015) ‘The Supreme Court decision in Nicklinson: Human rights, criminal wrong and the dilemma of death’ 
Professional Negligence 18 at p28, referring to Lady Hale’s statement in Nicklinson (fn 1 at [313]) that the appellants 
“experience the law’s insistence that they stay alive for the sake of others as a form of cruelty”. 
 
176 HL Bill 42, Arts 1-2. 
 
177 See Meisel, op cit fn 163 at pp 12.109-12.110. 
 
178 [2014] UKSC 38; [2015] AC 657 at [6], [12]. 
 
179 Jackson, op cit fn 98 at pp 1-5. See also Kuhse and Singer op cit fn 166 at p60 on marginally-viable infants: “killing 
an infant is not worse than letting the infant die. Often it will be better, because the swifter death will cause less suffering”. 
 
 23 
Goff also noted the law’s hypocrisy in allowing doctors to disconnect life support and let the patient 
die slowly, while prohibiting assistance that would: “put him out of his misery straight away, in a 
more humane manner, by a lethal injection, rather than let him linger on in pain until he dies”.180 A 
right to “the least painful death available” may be based on the prohibition of inhuman treatment,181 
engaged whenever the State: “blocks avenues which people might otherwise opt for to secure a less 
distressing death”.182 
 Surprisingly, non-discrimination claims were not given adequate consideration in right-to-die rulings 
(even Carter declining to examine s.15 arguments),183 although these were eminently equality cases. 
Since the law recognises patients’ right to choose death by switching off the life-support machine or 
travelling abroad to receive MAiD services, they must be able to ask for assistance from relatives or 
doctors if, due to disability, they can only exercise that right through a willing other. As Spriggs 
noted, autonomy may encompass “affirmative demands”, ie require acts “fostering autonomous 
decision making”.184 For patients reliant on others to govern their bodies, medical assistance may be 
necessary to effectively respect decisional autonomy. To the extent that severely disabled individuals, 
who cannot act independently, are only left with the tragic option of a slow painful death through 
self-starvation and self-dehydration, the prohibition on MAiD affects them with particular force.  
 
 
IV. Pragmatic concerns: the ‘protection of the vulnerable’ argument 
[A heading; 14 bold] 
 
The only arguable justification for curtailing the rights of patients seeking MAiD is the unintended 
effect of legalisation on vulnerable individuals pressurised into ending their lives. Dworkin noted that 
opponents of assisted suicide also invoke the principle of autonomy: “they worry that if euthanasia 
were legal people would be killed who really wanted to stay alive”.185 The argument that the assisted-
dying ban pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the vulnerable was readily accepted in the courts 
of both Canada and the UK.  
 However, there was surprisingly limited discussion of the notion of ‘vulnerability’. Treating all 
mentally-competent disabled persons as vulnerable and restricting their autonomy in the name of 
protecting them would be moral paternalism.186 A narrow definition of vulnerability, based on mental 
health and personal circumstances, is arguably required. In Pretty, the ECtHR expressly rejected the 
claim that severely disabled persons contemplating suicide were to be regarded as vulnerable.187 It is 
worth noting that the applicants for individual exemptions under Carter (No.2) were well-educated 
and well-off, and their relatives had initially opposed the decision to seek MAiD.188 Importantly, as 
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Schafer observed, patients requesting withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment are not deemed 
vulnerable, even though their life is equally at stake, and they may also be unduly influenced by over-
burdened families, emotional hardship or depression.189 The Canadian Supreme Court judiciously 
accepted in Carter that no different vulnerability concerns arise with respect to assisted dying when 
compared to other end-of-life decisions: 
 
[115] [T]here is no reason to think that the injured, ill, and disabled who have the option to refuse or to request withdrawal 
of lifesaving or life-sustaining treatment ... are less vulnerable or less susceptible to biased decision-making than those 
who might seek more active assistance in dying. 
 
Beaudry argued that deliberative autonomy cannot be ascertained satisfactorily, because wilful 
decisions may be the product of social conditions, and so under the new Canadian MAiD regime: “a 
desperate, marginalized citizen socially cornered into suicide may … be cast as an autonomous patient 
that has been treated respectfully”.190 Why ‘social autonomy’ concerns arise in relation to MAiD, but 
not withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, is left unanswered. A double standard, whereby patients 
requiring third-party assistance to end their lives are treated as vulnerable, while those who can do it 
unaided are not, is arbitrary and discriminatory.  
 Furthermore, if the vulnerable require protection against pressure to end their life, a blanket ban on 
assisted suicide is both overbroad and insufficient: it catches persons outside that class and fails to 
reach intended recipients. The ban cannot prevent vulnerable individuals from ending their life under 
pressure as long as this can be achieved by discontinuing treatment or they are physically able to 
commit suicide or travel to a jurisdiction permitting MAiD. As Mullock noted, this lack of effective 
protection for vulnerable patients calls into question the rational connection between the ban and its 
objective.191 Critically, the ban impacts competent individuals of limited means or who lost command 
of their body; they are denied a right everyone else has to see their end-of-life decisions respected. 
Admittedly, this is a narrow category; however, the low number of individuals affected is not a valid 
justification for restrictions upon fundamental rights. That contention was rejected by Strasbourg 
authorities.192 In Bedford, the Canadian Supreme Court also clarified that, even if a law has a grossly 
disproportionate effect on one individual only, it still violates the Charter.193  
 While both Supreme Courts accepted the vulnerability rationale, they differed on whether it had to 
be addressed through a blanket prohibition, as opposed to a mechanism ensuring that assistance is 
only provided in appropriate cases. In the unanimous judgment of the Canadian Supreme Court, it 
was possible to allow MAiD and establish a system of safeguards. Conversely, the majority in the 
UK Supreme Court felt unable to decide in the absence of a specific legislative scheme, and supported 
a policy excluding risks of error and abuse. The Court of Appeal in Conway concluded that the scheme 
before it was not fool-proof and similarly preferred a precautionary approach. Nevertheless, the 
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avoidance of potential risks generates the absolute certainty of curbing some individuals’ basic rights 
on speculative grounds.194 This in turn speaks to questions of proportionality. 
 
 
V. Necessity and proportionality   [A heading: 14 bold] 
 
 The meanings ascribed to the notions of necessity and proportionality in both jurisdictions provide a 
constant theme for analysis in the chapters in this volume. In the assisted-dying context, three facets 
of proportionality have particular prominence: the onus of establishing a preferable alternative 
scheme, ‘slippery slope’ concerns, and the toleration of assistance in the prosecutorial practice.   
 
 
Apportioning the burden of proof: must claimants devise unassailable alternatives?  
[B heading; 12 bold] 
  
The conceptualisation of justifications for interferences is marginally different between Canada and 
the UK. Under s.7 of the Canadian Charter, interferences must be in accordance with “principles of 
fundamental justice”, ie not arbitrary, overbroad or having consequences grossly disproportionate to 
the objectives.195 Section 7 infringements can still be saved by s.1, if they pursued a pressing objective 
and observed proportionality, the latter being defined by: (1) rational connection; (2) minimal 
impairment; (3) deleterious effects and salutary benefits. Art 8(2) ECHR establishes a three-pronged 
test: the measure must be “prescribed by law” (not arbitrary), pursue one of the “legitimate aim(s)” 
listed, and be “necessary in a democratic society”; the third criterion requires a proportionality test, 
ie demonstration of a pressing need and recourse to the minimum interference sufficient to achieve 
the aim.196 The Charter and the ECHR frameworks legitimising restrictions are therefore similar, even 
if the algorithms for analysis follow slightly different paths. 
 In assisted-dying case-law, there are two striking features in the British courts’ approach to 
justification: first, the acceptance without demonstration of great risks associated with regulation, as 
opposed to complete ban;197 second, the focus on the exact substitute for the ban, and specifically the 
claimant’s responsibility to devise it. Since it was acknowledged that the blanket ban curtails 
individual rights, one would expect the respondent to be required to provide cogent justification, 
absent which the measure breaches the HRA. However, the Supreme Court majority in Nicklinson 
shifted the burden onto applicants to demonstrate that the interference was not justified, and nothing 
short of a fully-perfected legislative scheme met that burden.198 This influenced the claimant’s 
submissions in Conway, which took the unusual form of a legislative proposal; in fact, much of the 
High Court’s assessment revolved around the merits of that solution, instead of examining the status 
quo. The appellate decision also focused on Mr Conway’s solution, concluding that it did not offer 
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adequate protection to the vulnerable. The expectations placed by the Court of Appeal on individual 
litigants are astounding:199 
 
[10 normal] [174] It is not satisfactory to say … that all of those practical and regulatory details could be worked out by 
Parliament … Those considerations are relevant as to whether the court is in a position to hold section 2(1) to be 
incompatible in the first place.  
 
 By contrast, in Carter, the Canadian Supreme Court did not expect claimants to prove that liberty-
limiting legislation was disproportionate; rather, it required the respondent to demonstrate the 
necessity of the restriction pursuant to the Oakes test.200 Nor did it attempt to decide the exact 
alternative to the status quo. The court invalidated the provisions banning all assistance in dying, but 
the task of revisiting the law was left to Parliament. The only legislative direction included in the 
judgment was the requirement that any new MAiD rights for patients be reconciled with doctors’ 
rights not to be compelled to provide assistance.201  
 The minority in Nicklinson had taken the same approach. For Lord Kerr, the absence of a well-
thought-out replacement scheme should not affect the evaluation of the present ban’s proportionality:  
 
[10 normal] [354] It is entirely possible to assert that a particular provision would go beyond what it seeks to achieve 
without having to describe the details of a more tailored measure that would attain that aim. … The measure must be 
intrinsically proportionate.  
 
This view better reflects the s.4 HRA mechanism, which empowers courts to decide if a law breaches 
human rights, not how it should be amended; the exact remedy is left to the legislature. It follows that 
a substitute for the offending law should not be claimants’ onus either. 
 The House of Lords in Bellinger refused to strain the interpretation of s.11(c) Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973 under s.3 HRA202 (preferring a s.4 declaration instead) precisely because the court was not 
the appropriate institution for shaping complex legislative schemes with systemic implications.203 
The Bellinger judgment found that the failure to recognise transsexual persons’ acquired gender and 
capacity to marry according to it breached Arts 8 and 12 ECHR. That no clear criteria for gender 
reassignment were available did not preclude a s.4 declaration (nor had this been an obstacle for the 
ECtHR in Goodwin v UK).204 Mrs Bellinger was not required to demonstrate how the law would 
resolve the difficulties regarding medical evidence of intention to live in the new gender permanently, 
the amount of time in the new social gender required for legal sex change, or the status of mother/ 
father of children born before gender reassignment. Parliament made those decisions in the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004. Analogously, judicial assessment of the assisted-dying ban can precede the 
elaboration of a new legislative scheme to address HRA-incompatibilities. 
 
 
The ‘slippery slope’ argument [B heading; 12 bold] 
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The crux of the assisted-dying controversy lies in the lack of scope for exceptional authorisation. 
Proportionality requires that interferences be no more than necessary to safeguard legitimate aims; 
consequently, blanket bans affecting human rights are rarely defensible, because they make no 
allowance for special circumstances and do not permit a remedy strictly commensurate with the 
problem.205 Moreover, a fair balance presupposes a reasonable reconciliation between competing 
rights. A blanket ban fails to achieve a balance, as one party is required to sacrifice all. McLachlin J, 
dissenting, concluded in Rodriguez: “Sue Rodriguez is asked to bear the burden of the chance that 
other people in other situations may act criminally to kill others or improperly sway them to suicide. 
She is asked to serve as a scapegoat”.206 From a bioethical perspective, law presupposes a 
‘compromise’ between contrasting interests in society: “both sides getting a bit of what they want 
while neither side gets all of what it wants”;207 the blanket ban on MAiD fails to achieve a reasonable 
compromise, because it gives one side absolutely nothing.  
 This extreme position was rationalised in the literature by ‘slippery slope’ arguments, broadly 
reducible to two claims: (1) once MAiD is permitted, the practice cannot be contained within its 
anticipated boundaries, as further demands based on autonomy/ mercy killing will follow; (2) 
whatever criteria are adopted, abuse cannot be excluded, and patients falling outside those criteria 
will be assisted to die (‘empirical’ slippery slope).208 The second version of the slippery slope was 
prominent in assisted-dying litigation in both jurisdictions, when courts inquired whether an absolute 
ban was necessary and proportionate.  
 For the Canadian Supreme Court, the ban unjustifiably infringed the rights of competent consenting 
adults suffering intolerably; a permissive regime with proper safeguards could protect vulnerable 
people from abuse and error. As Schafer explained: “Oakes requires that there must be strong 
evidence (rather than mere a priori speculation) that coercive restrictions are both necessary and 
sufficient to promote the values in question”.209 The minority in Nicklinson also challenged the 
proportionality of an absolute prohibition. For Lady Hale, the ban violates Art 8 ECHR insofar as: “it 
does not provide for any exception for people who have made a capacitous, free and fully informed 
decision to commit suicide but require help to do so.” 210  
 Conversely, the Nicklinson majority accepted speculative scenarios of vulnerable people pressurised 
into choosing death and noted the absence of an alternative before the court, concluding that the ban 
struck a fair balance. For the Court of Appeal in Conway, where a specific scheme was available, 
proportionality was satisfied by the theoretic impossibility of removing all risks: “an element of risk 
will inevitably remain in assessing whether an applicant has met the criteria”.211 The court invoked 
“the potential for indirect coercion or undue influence”; in particular, it adduced that: [a] sense of 
being a burden may be projected subconsciously and then expressed … as a genuinely felt belief”.212 
Since risks remained a factor in examining proportionality, the court deferred the entire assessment 
to the legislator:  
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[10 normal] [171] [T]he weight to be given to that risk, in deciding whether or not the blanket ban on assisted suicide is 
both necessary and proportionate, involves an evaluative judgement and a policy decision, which ... Parliament is ... better 
placed than the court to make.  
 
There was no discussion of the consistency of the law, and how the ban protects terminally ill or 
severely disabled patients who, ridden with subconscious guilt or subjected to undue influence, retain 
the capacity to disconnect a breathing tube or travel to Dignitas. The court further voiced concerns 
over medical complications potentially arising from assisted dying,213 without considering premature 
or botched suicide attempts prompted by the lack of professional assistance, causing injury or a more 
painful death.  
 The Court of Appeal also over-emphasised the six-months eligibility criterion and the impossibility 
of accurate predictions.214 This focus on a precise diagnosis stands in contrast with the fluid language 
of s.241.2(2)(d) of the Canadian Criminal Code, requiring that the patient’s “natural death has become 
reasonably foreseeable”. Addressing a difference of medical opinion on a patient’s eligibility in A.B. 
v Canada, the Ontario Court stressed that, according to its legislative history, s.241.2(2)(d) was 
deliberately flexible, to indicate that its purpose was not to require terminal illness, but rather: “to 
ensure that people who are on a trajectory toward death in a wide range of circumstances can choose 
a peaceful death instead of having to endure a long or painful one”.215 
  The UK and Canadian courts’ position varied radically on whether court authorisation is a reliable 
safeguard against mistake and abuse. Conway expressed strong doubts about the costs and 
effectiveness of judicial supervision.216 It is worth noting that the Crown Prosecution Service reported 
only 138 assisted suicide cases between 1 April 2009 and 31 January 2018.217 The trifling average 
number each year (even considering a possible increase if MAiD becomes available) does not support 
the objection that courts lack resources to assess MAiD requests.218 Moreover, the lack of confidence 
in courts’ expertise cannot be reconciled with their existing role in medical cases: “doctors – and 
sometimes judges – already have to assess the capacity of individuals to make life-and-death choices 
in the related context of a patient’s wish to refuse treatment necessary to keep her or him alive”.219  
 By contrast, in Carter (No.2) the Canadian Supreme Court characterised the regime of judicial 
authorisation of individual exemptions during the extended suspension of invalidity as “an effective 
safeguard against potential risks to vulnerable people”.220 The cases decided under Carter (No.2) 
confirmed courts’ ability to assess consent. In Re H.S., the first of such cases, the Court of Queen’s 
Bench of Alberta reviewed testimony that the applicant had been inquiring into assisted-dying options 
for two years, had shown resolve to end her life peacefully in multiple discussions with medical 
professionals, family and friends, had received counselling regarding palliative care, and had been 
informed of risks associated with physician-assisted death.221 Examining further petitions for 
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permission to proceed with MAiD, provincial courts conducted similar inquiries and were satisfied 
without hesitation that the applicants met the Carter criteria.222  
 Significantly, when assessing proportionality in Pretty, the ECtHR accepted that the general 
prohibition on assisted suicide was mitigated by the “flexibility … provided for in individual cases 
by the fact that consent is needed from the DPP to bring a prosecution” and by “a system of 
enforcement and adjudication which allows due regard to be given in each particular case to the public 
interest in bringing a prosecution”.223 What the ECtHR had not considered, and became manifest in 
Purdy, was that the unpredictable exercise of DPP discretion deterred patients from requesting 
assistance and physicians/ carers from providing it. It also meant that assistance will usually involve 
relatives’ help to travel abroad, which is costly and unavailable to patients without immediate family, 
like Martin in Nicklinson. The fact that few cases are prosecuted224 is distinct from an anticipatory 
exemption, especially given the stakes: deprivation of liberty, criminal record, social stigma attached 
to committing a criminal offence. Lord Rees highlighted the impact on relatives offering assistance 
during parliamentary debates on the Assisted Dying Bill 2016-17: “Those acts may not result in 
prosecution, but a shadow of criminality hangs over them and adds to the grief of those whose motive 
is compassion.”225 While the ECtHR was satisfied that, overall, the regime was within the boundaries 
of the UK’s margin of appreciation, domestic courts can take a stricter approach to Parliament’s 
balancing act.  
 
 
Proleptic immunity for assisters vs ex post facto prosecutorial assessment [B heading; 12 bold] 
 
 Rather alarmingly, the combination of legislative ban and prosecutorial toleration disadvantages the 
class of vulnerable individuals whom the ban should protect. The evidence before English courts 
showed that compassionate assistance in dying is rarely prosecuted, despite its criminalisation. As 
Lord Neuberger suggested in Nicklinson, the practice comes close to tolerating assisted dying.226 In 
Canada, a similar trend was noted before the 2016 reform, resulting from prosecutorial and judicial 
discretion.227  
 This practice casts doubt on the proportionality of the interference with fundamental rights. As 
Adenitire argued, the expectation to immunity from prosecution, generated by the DPP’s guidelines 
and consistent non-prosecution policy, shows that the blanket ban is not truly necessary.228 There is 
also a troubling discrepancy between the law (criminalising all assistance) and the State’s/ society’s 
recognition that exceptional assistance is morally appropriate. In Bland, Hofmann LJ held that 
euthanasia: “is not an area in which any difference can be allowed to exist between what is legal and 
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what is morally right”.229 The same stands true of assisted dying. The law should not collide with, but 
accommodate, the treatment of individual cases. Lord Sumption controversially suggested that: “the 
law should continue to criminalise assisted suicide, and … be broken from time to time”;230 this 
approach avoids finding a legal solution and perpetuates the separation between law and morality.  
 On a practical level, non-prosecution instead of anticipatory authorisation of assistance undermines 
the protection of the vulnerable. Lord Mance noted in Nicklinson that individuals are currently 
assisted despite the prohibition and without prior review.231 The DPP’s retrospective assessment of 
circumstances cannot adequately protect the vulnerable.232 The scrutiny of planned assistance, under 
a regime of exceptional authorisations, would better serve the aim of the law: more evidence would 
be available, consent and undue influence could be more accurately ascertained, and improper 
assistance could be prevented. Moreover, for patients’ and assisters’ peace of mind, the certainty of 
prior authorisation is fundamentally different from the likelihood of subsequent condonation.   
 From an institutional perspective, Parliament is abdicating its mandate if, in difficult areas, it 
relegates to prosecutors the task of adjusting the inequities of the law. In R (Kenward) v DPP, 
rejecting the claim that the DPP’s amended policy for prosecutors placed vulnerable individuals at 
risk, the High Court struggled to establish that the policy: “does not remove bright lines ... and no 
assistance or encouragement is rendered lawful”, while admitting that the decision whether to 
prosecute: “will always involve a very detailed consideration of all the facts and, ultimately, a 
balanced judgement”.233 A bright-line rule and a composite judgment are mutually exclusive, and the 
statute should be amended to reflect the latter approach. 
 Moreover, since Parliament has set a blanket ban and compassionate assistance in dying is in practice 
decriminalised, a conflict emerges between primary legislation and prosecutorial policy, buttressed 
by the courts’ ambivalence. Lewis has criticised the: “opaque process of informal legal change by 
prosecutors”.234 However, as Stark observed: “[i]f the DPP’s prosecution policy becomes too specific 
it may constitute a (presumably illegitimate) usurpation of this clear legislative statement by carving 
out an area of assisted suicide that is, de facto, decriminalised”.235 From a constitutional standpoint, 
it is undesirable for courts to endorse a contra legem administrative policy as a corrective tool, instead 




VI. The constitutional role of the judiciary in highly divisive ethical debates  
[A heading; 14 bold] 
 
 British and Canadian assisted-dying rulings revealed similar concerns over how the legal system is 
structured to decide sensitive ethical matters: whether they are the exclusive realm of Parliament or 
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the role falls on Parliament assisted by the courts. The different answers to this question might be  
explained in part by British courts’ limited prerogatives under HRA 1998 when compared to the 
constitutionally entrenched strike-down power of Canadian courts under the Constitution Act 1982.236 
However, courts’ function under s.4 HRA is not merely an advisory one; they are called upon to 
authoritatively assess the law’s respect for human rights. Rather, the outcome of applications appears 
explained by judges’ personal views of their mission and of the justiciability of the dispute. An 
interpretation of the margin of appreciation left to States under the ECHR as parliamentary discretion 
acts as an additional break on judicial review. This is compounded by the UK’s strict adherence to 




Democratic law-making and judicial self-restraint [B heading: 12 bold] 
 
 British and Canadian courts view the role of the judiciary very differently in ethically divisive policy 
areas. In Carter, the Canadian Supreme Court showed no institutional self-doubt in assessing Charter-
compatibility regardless of the subject-matter of the dispute. Conversely, many British judges deemed 
certain policy areas non-justiciable or considered that judicial intervention should be limited in 
deference to parliamentary sovereignty. Lord Bingham in Pretty suggested that the court was unable 
to make ethical and moral decisions, insofar as it was not a legislative body.237 In Nicklinson, the 
court was extremely divided as regards its proper role. For several justices, the issue engaged an 
important determination on social policy and a moral judgment on the balance between competing 
rights, and the legislative process was best placed to resolve controversial and complex questions.238 
However, Lord Neuberger noted courts’ historical engagement with moral choices:  
 
[10 normal] [98] [T]he mere fact that there are moral issues involved plainly does not mean that the courts have to keep 
out. Even before the 1998 Act came into force, the courts were prepared to make decisions which developed the law and 
involved making moral choices of this type. 
 
 The idea that courts adjudicating HRA claims are not competent to entertain disputes involving 
questions of morality is unconvincing. Most cases occasioning s.4 declarations concerned morally 
sensitive issues: recognition of transsexuals’ acquired gender, sham marriage and immigration 
control, posthumous fatherhood, detention without trial of foreign terrorist suspects, 
decriminalisation of certain consensual sexual behaviour.239 Indeed, proceedings leading to s.4 
declarations are unlikely to concern straightforward matters, which Parliament could have easily 
regulated without affecting human rights. Stark insisted that: “resolving such value conflicts is not 
the courts’ constitutional role”.240 However, rights cannot be dissociated from values. The scope of a 
right depends on the boundaries between the competing values engaged, and courts are tasked to 
interpret rights. Insofar as this is a mandate given by Parliament, it does not contravene parliamentary 
sovereignty. Admittedly, morals-laden disputes can attract greater deference to Parliament when 
courts assess balancing acts, but the justiciability of the claim should not be questioned. As Coggon 
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argued: “For a functioning, democratic system to operate, the last thing the courts must do is shirk 
their responsibilities simply because of moral controversy and ethical disagreement”.241  
 However, British assisted-dying decisions disclose institutional unease with upholding challenges to 
legislative measures. Concerns were expressed in Nicklinson over institutional remits: “the legislative 
function is committed to Parliament and courts must not usurp it”.242 Although for five judges the 
court had the constitutional authority to declare the ban incompatible with Art 8, only two (Lady Hale 
and Lord Kerr) were prepared to do so; they reasoned that, when issuing a s.4 declaration, courts do 
precisely what the HRA empowered them to do, ie remit an issue to Parliament for a political 
decision.243 While the limited reach of declarations of incompatibility might be expected to stimulate 
greater scrutiny of legislative action, the High Court in T justified self-restraint precisely by contrast 
with Canadian courts’ powers: 244  
 
[10 normal] [19] The provisions of the [Charter] give the Canadian courts a central role, as, in effect, a constitutional 
court, interpreting a written constitution, with no question of any inhibition derived from the role of the Canadian 
legislature.  
 
This analysis may unduly diminish the pivotal role of judicial protection of human rights under the 
UK’s unwritten constitution and downplay the HRA mandate for British courts. In a country lacking 
a formal constitution, statutes “of constitutional importance”, within the meaning of Thoburn v 
Sunderland City Council,245 such as HRA 1998 should carry particular weight. The different legal 
effect of a finding of incompatibility as opposed to a judgment of invalidation already absorbs any 
distinction between the UK Supreme Court and a constitutional court; a further self-imposed 
restriction ratione materiae on judicial oversight would constitute a double ceiling on courts’ 
democratic control.         
 Given the history of consistent parliamentary accommodation of declarations of incompatibility,246 
some judges might view s.4 as more powerful in practice than under the statute,247 almost tantamount 
to legislative decisions made by an institution lacking democratic credentials. This position, however, 
would entail that, when enacting HRA 1998, Parliament intended for courts to use s.4 powers only 
for uncontroversial issues, requiring marginal changes. By removing the most critical issues from the 
scope of judicial supervision and diminishing human-rights protection, such an interpretation would 
go against the purpose of the statute. Nor is there any unwritten constitutional rule that all s.4 
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declarations must be followed, as shown by the failure to address prisoners’ right to vote following 
Smith v Scott248 (admittedly, not a Supreme Court decision and one lacking popular support).249     
 Another qualification on the use of s.4 added by the case-law is that courts should refrain from issuing 
a declaration on matters before Parliament. In Nicklinson, three justices found that SA 1961 might 
breach HRA provisions, but it would be inappropriate for the court to assess compliance before giving 
Parliament an opportunity to reconsider its position.250 Conway confirmed this a contrario; the High 
Court held that, since Parliament was not actively considering the law at the time of the proceedings, 
nothing precluded it from revisiting the matter.251 Not only does s.4 not require courts to abstain from 
issuing a declaration on matters pending in Parliament, but that seems, conversely, an auspicious time 
for courts to contribute their legally trained views. One purpose of s.4 is, in fact, to invite the 
legislature to re-examine a statute with the benefit of the highest courts’ professional opinion.  
 The refusal in Nicklinson to issue a s.4 declaration due to the contemporaneous parliamentary debate 
was an unfortunate departure from Bellinger, 252 where the court took the opposite view on the 
dialogue between courts and Parliament on HRA-incompatibility issues:  
 
[10 normal] [55] [W]hen proceedings are already before the House, it is desirable that in a case of such sensitivity this 
House, as the court of final appeal in this country, should formally record that the present state of statute law is 
incompatible with the Convention.  
 
Crawford noted that, in several cases in which s.4 declarations were issued: “the process of amending 
the impugned legislation was well underway, or indeed completed, by the time the court made the 
declaration of incompatibility”.253 
  An equally questionable requirement read into s.4 HRA by the Nicklinson majority is that courts 
must have a viable legislative alternative in order to issue a declaration of incompatibility. This 
requirement is nowhere in the statute, and for courts to choose the ‘correct’ alternative would actually 
be out of step with the separation-of-powers principle.254 The dissenters in Nicklinson, who saw their 
remit as deciding if the law breached fundamental rights and demanded rethinking, criticised the 
majority’s demand for a ready-made replacement. Regrettably, the Supreme Court majority’s 
approach in Nicklinson was magnified by the Court of Appeal, for whom the court’s role in Conway 
was to assess the litigant’s legislative proposal rather than the impugned law: “the court is restricted 
to considering the suitability of the precise scheme proposed by Mr Conway”.255 Conway thus 
consolidated the view that, under the HRA, courts must decide not only if the status quo breaches any 
rights, but also – as a prerequisite for that conclusion – how the breach should be remedied.  
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 The Court of Appeal also justified self-restraint by stressing courts’ limited ability to gauge social 
support for reform: “Unlike Parliament, … the court cannot conduct consultations with the public … 
and cannot engage experts and advisers on its own account”.256 Since the s.4 declaration would remit 
the issue for consideration to Parliament, the latter can launch public consultations before any legal 
change is effected. Additionally, nothing precludes courts from considering the evidence of societal 
support for reform publicly available. Indeed, various surveys indicate substantial popular support for 
MAiD in the UK.257  
 Importantly, s.4 declarations are agenda-setting. So far, most attempts at reform have failed due to 
lack of parliamentary time, bills failing to progress after the formality of the first-reading stage, which 
does not involve debate.258 A s.4 declaration would place the issue firmly on the British Parliament’s 
agenda. It would be erroneous to infer from the lack of success of parliamentary attempts to date259 
that the matter has been adequately considered and the prevailing view is that the blanket ban is 
preferable to a nuanced solution. In the Canadian Parliament, sixteen legislative attempts at changing 
assisted-dying policy took place before Carter, none of which government bills.260 It was the Supreme 
Court’s ruling that finally galvanised legislative efforts.  
 Hogg and Bushell argued, addressing claims that judicial review under the Canadian Charter is 
undemocratic, that a Charter decision: “causes a public debate in which Charter values play a more 
prominent role”;261 it forces Parliament to examine a topic, but this ‘dialogue’ between institutions: 
“culminates in a democratic decision”.262 Their sequel article clarified: “since the last word can nearly 
always be (and usually is) that of the legislature, the anti-majoritarian objection to judicial review is 
not particularly strong”.263 The same holds true (even more so) of the relationship between courts and 
legislature under the HRA scheme. 
 Some hesitation as to courts’ proper role was also seen in the earlier right-to-die Canadian case-law. 
In Rodriguez, while the majority did not feel precluded from examining Charter-compatibility by the 
moral complexities of the case, it was overly deferential in its examination of proportionality.264 That 
position was abandoned in Carter, which adopted a more stringent standard of review. Many saw the 
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ruling as a legitimate exercise of a function conferred by the Constitution. In fact: “the Charter 
enables Supreme Court justices to push forward policy through rights-based litigation”.265 Others 
viewed Carter as an expression of judicial activism, with reference, in particular, to the detailed 
remedy provided. Newman lamented the court’s “over-specificity in itself crafting a regime within 
its declaration that … constrains parliamentary choices”.266 It is difficult to see, however, how the 
judgment could have defined the scope of the breach without identifying those unlawfully caught by 
the ban: competent adults suffering from a grievous medical condition with no acceptable treatment 
available and having reached an informed decision to end their lives.  
 Opinions also differed on the practicality of the remedy in Carter. For Surtees, the court: “wisely 
provided Canadians with a default regulator in the event that our elected representatives choose not 
to act”.267 Conversely, Ettel criticised Carter for the unclear remedy, should Parliament not respond 
to the declaration.268 The limited usefulness of declarations of incompatibility for individual 
applicants might be an inevitable consequence of the court’s strike-down, as opposed to legislative, 
powers and the system’s reliance on inter-institutional cooperation. Even so, Carter (No.2), by 
offering interim constitutional exemptions, better reconciled the separation of powers with practical 
remedies to applicants (and others in their position). This solution was, however, not exempted from 
criticism. Rahimi described it as: “a vivid example of the judiciary usurping the legislative role of 
Parliament by implementing a de facto regulatory system overseeing [MAiD]”.269  
 The Lamb case presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to relax its control over the MAiD 
regime by upholding Parliament’s scheme notwithstanding its contrast with the more liberal Carter 
criteria. According to Rahimi: “Endorsing Bill C-14 as constitutional would allow the courts to 
reverse the prescriptive judgment in Carter, which was arguably an overreach by the SCC”.270 With 
the Lamb case adjourned, and the finding of invalidity in Truchon unchallenged, the Supreme Court 
no longer has to choose between full rights protection and democratic concessions to Parliament. 
 Canada’s recent experience – courts’ willingness to tackle sensitive policy choices and Parliament’s 
response to findings of invalidity – suggests that a dynamic legislative process relies on inter-
institutional prompts and checks. Meanwhile, British courts seem to be moving towards a complete 
referral to Parliament on assisted-dying regulation, rather than co-shaping this area of law. 
 
 
Charter ‘dialogue’ and the suspension of declarations of invalidity [B heading: 12 bold] 
 
 The suspension of the declaration of invalidity in Carter was met with doctrinal criticism, given the 
historical rationale for suspensions as emergency tools,271 and practical objections, since it imposed 
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an additional year of suffering on individuals whose rights Carter found violated and who meanwhile 
could lose capacity to consent.272 Burningham noted that, unlike the power to strike down legislation, 
grounded in s.52 of the Constitution Act 1982, the suspension of declarations of invalidity is a judicial 
creation, designed to prevent intolerable situations,273 whereas ordering the immediate invalidity of 
s.241(b) would not have generated either legal chaos or danger to the public (as per Schachter v 
Canada).274 The text of s.52 indeed suggests that a finding of unconstitutionality attracts the 
immediate nullity of the offending law,275 the declaration merely acknowledging that it was void ab 
initio. However, it is not far-fetched to argue that danger to the public existed: without careful 
regulation, vulnerable individuals could have resorted to MAiD in unwarranted cases. For that very 
reason, Carter (No.2) temporarily replaced regulation with judicial scrutiny in provincial courts. 
 Hogg et al have defended the practice of suspensions of declarations of invalidity based on a different 
rationale in Charter jurisprudence after Schachter: inter-institutional dialogue, a theory recognising 
that Parliament is better placed to design corrective laws and select from several alternatives.276 
However, given the urgency for those deprived of constitutional rights and the potentially irreversible 
damage, a better compromise, halfway between exceptionalism and dialogue, might have been a 
suspension of invalidity accompanied by individual constitutional exemptions, similar to the regime 
introduced after the original 12-month suspension. Ultimately, the decision in Carter (No.2) to 
suspend the invalidity and grant individual exemptions as an interim emergency measure also shows 
adherence to the ‘dialogue’ doctrine, observing the different remits of Parliament and courts.277 
 
 
‘Margin of appreciation’ under the ECHR and s.4 HRA declarations [B heading: 12 bold] 
 
In Pretty, the ECtHR found the British assisted-dying regime consistent with Art 8(2), and subsequent 
judgments did not alter ECHR standards. According to Haas v Switzerland, the minimum common 
denominator in Europe on the scope of privacy did not encompass a right to receive assistance in 
dying, and a wide margin of appreciation continued to apply to end-of-life issues; European States: 
“are far from having reached a consensus with regard to an individual’s right to decide how and when 
his or her life should end”.278 A wide margin was confirmed in Koch v Germany.279 As evidenced by 
Lambert v France, authorising withdrawal of artificial life-sustaining treatment is a legitimate 
exercise of State discretion.280  
 Simplistically, it might be thought that, if the right to assisted dying under the ECHR has been 
declined in Strasbourg proceedings, a different conclusion by UK courts is unwarranted. This would 
overlook, however, the margin left to States to reassess the boundaries of Art 8 in non liquet cases, 
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where the court does not take a stand, accepting both the impugned law and its opposite as ECHR-
compatible.281 The ECHR is the minimum European common standard, and domestic authorities can 
afford greater protection.282 British courts have accepted that “Convention rights” under the HRA 
may go beyond the level required for international compliance with the ECHR. In Fitzpatrick, the 
House of Lords recognised that committed same-sex partners constituted “family life” under Art 8283 
before the ECtHR did so in Schalk and Kopf v Austria.284 The finding in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza 
that s.3 HRA required housing legislation to be read as assimilating same-sex cohabitants to couples 
living as spouses for the purposes of succession to tenancies285 did not imply that all ECHR parties 
had that obligation.  
 The House of Lords confirmed the possibility of a distinct claim of HRA-incompatibility even where 
there is no ECHR breach in Re G (Adoption: Unmarried Couple).286 The dual scope of ECHR rights 
in international and domestic perspective was upheld by the ECtHR in Oliari v Italy: legal recognition 
for same-sex couples in Italy was a constitutional entitlement enforceable in ECHR proceedings, even 
if no such pan-European right existed.287 In Conway, the High Court recalled that: “the interpretation 
of the domestic version of the Convention rights in the HRA does not simply mirror the Convention 
rights in the ECHR”.288 Consequently, a declaration of incompatibility does not always signal a 
breach of international obligations; it may regard an inconsistency with a Convention right as 
understood domestically. The s.4 declaration in Z (A Child) (No.2), concerning single persons’ 
ineligibility for parental orders following surrogacy arrangements,289 was not based on ECHR 
regulatory standards, surrogacy remaining an area of wide State discretion.290  
 Moreover, a s.4 declaration based on Art 8 taken in conjunction with Art 14 (and many claimants in 
right-to-die cases invoked their right to non-discrimination) can also be granted in respect of purely 
domestic rights linked with ECHR rights.291 The Supreme Court accepted this in Steinfeld, issuing a 
s.4 declaration in relation to the bar in s.3 Civil Partnerships Act 2004, which excluded heterosexual 
couples, although there was no ECHR right to form such partnerships.292  
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 The potential HRA-incompatibility of s.2(1) SA, notwithstanding the finding in Pretty v UK that it 
did not breach ECHR obligations, was recognised in Nicklinson and emphasised by the High Court 
in T. The latter judgment expressly indicated that the case was adjudicated only under the HRA, 
insofar as Strasbourg authorities allowed for a wide margin of appreciation in end-of-life matters.293 
Nonetheless, judicial views varied on whether all government branches contribute to the domestic 
balancing act within that margin. According to Lord Mance in Nicklinson, this is a shared 
responsibility: 
 
[10 normal] [163] Where a “considerable” margin of appreciation exists at the international level, both the legislature and 
the judiciary have a potential role in assessing whether the law is at the domestic level compatible with such rights. 
 
By contrast, for Lord Hughes, the discretion left by the ECtHR must be exercised by Parliament as a 
matter of constitutional law: 
 
[10 normal] [267] It is true that Strasbourg thus regards the question as one to be resolved by individual States within 
their margin of appreciation. But in this country, with our constitutional division of responsibility between Parliament 
and the courts, this is very clearly a decision which falls to be made by Parliament.  
 
Newby suggested even more bluntly that courts should not reverse parliamentary decisions: “courts 
are not the venue for arguments which have failed to convince Parliament”.294 This counter-




Precedence and legal change in lower courts [B heading; 12 bold] 
 
Assisted-dying claims, challenging established norms, raised the question of whether the impetus for 
reform can start in the lower courts, given the stare decisis principle presumptively applicable in both 
Canada and the UK. As Loveland notes in his chapter in this book, Canada’s lower courts “played 
fast and loose”295 with this principle in respect of Canadian libel law. Provincial courts produced 
judgments prima facie irreconcilable with supposedly binding Supreme Court authority. The effect 
was not to trigger a normative crisis in the Constitution’s judicial hierarchy but to prompt the Supreme 
Court significantly to alter its own views.296  
 A similar trend is evident in assisted-dying cases. In Carter, the Supreme Court restored the trial 
judge’s decision that the prohibition against MAiD infringed s.7 rights of competent adults suffering 
intolerably due to a grievous and irremediable medical condition and was not justified under s.1 of 
the Charter. That decision had been reversed on appeal, on the ground that the trial judge was bound 
by the Supreme Court’s Rodriguez judgment, upholding the blanket ban.297 The Supreme Court 
accepted that trial courts can reconsider settled rulings of higher courts where a new legal issue is 
raised or where there is a “change in the circumstances or the evidence” that “fundamentally shifts 
the parameters of the debate”; it found that both conditions were met in Carter: the legal conception 
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of s.7 had advanced since Rodriguez (the law on overbreadth and gross disproportionality) and the 
legislative and social facts differed from the evidence before that court.298 
 The language of Carter on the rule of precedence is broad. It suggests that lower courts have 
significant discretion in ascertaining fundamental changes in legal culture, social opinion or medical 
evidence and disregarding precedent. This flexible view of precedence means that legal progress is 
not reined in by judicial hierarchy, and a case need not reach the Supreme Court if substantial changes 
in circumstances require a change in the law. However, this approach has not been universally 
welcomed. According to Newman, this departure from the rule against anticipatory overruling is 
unexplained and shows a “striking disdain for precedent”.299 One could argue that, in respect of new 
rights claimed under the Charter, a relaxation of stare decisis is desirable given the parties’ inequality 
of arms; the respondent public authority will always have the resources to take the case to the final 
stage, whereas the financial burden on individual litigants means that the Supreme Court may never 
hear the case and have an opportunity to revisit its position.  
 In contrast with these developments in Canada, British courts have consistently supported a strict 
view of precedence. In Conway, the High Court found that it was not bound by Nicklinson only 
because of its peculiar context: an assisted-dying bill was before Parliament, which prompted the 
majority to defer the assessment of HRA-compatibility.300 The Court of Appeal drew two further 
distinctions: Nicklinson regarded patients in long-term suffering rather than terminally-ill patients 
within six months of death, and the appellant had put forward a specific legislative model that could 
replace the blanket prohibition.301 The High Court in Newby found itself bound by the Court of Appeal 
decision in Conway even in the presence of a new claim under Art 2 ECHR.302 Absent special 
circumstances, lower courts appear unwilling to provide a fresh reappraisal of arguments based on 
new evidence, intervening experience in other jurisdictions, or changes in social opinion. 
 
 
Parliaments’ ambivalent view of courts as constitutional interpreters 
  
Mullock suggested that, despite the dismissal of the Nicklinson appeal, the judgment “has almost had 
as much impact as a verdict in favour of Nicklinson, Lamb and Martin”,303 and that the warning that 
a s.4 declaration might be issued in the future had the same influence as an actual declaration.304 This 
proved to be overoptimistic. Ironically, the refusal of British judges to issue a s.4 declaration was a 
hindrance to parliamentary debates. Martin noted the confusion that Nicklinson generated as to what 
is expected of Parliament during the House of Commons’ consideration of the 2015 bill; this included 
the interpretation by MPs that the law did not need changing, insofar as only two judges found it 
incompatible with the ECHR, or that Parliament acted within the margin of appreciation.305 Given 
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courts’ s.4 power to alert Parliament to legislative solutions falling short of HRA standards, any obiter 
comments on the desirability of reviewing the law, without a formal finding of incompatibility, are 
likely to remain inconsequential. Declarations of incompatibility have been consistently followed by 
compliant legislative responses and the continuation of the ban cannot be seen as parliamentary 
defiance of the courts. Rather, courts have chosen not to place any constraints on Parliament as 
regards assisted-death legislation, notwithstanding their constitutional mandate under the HRA.   
 The unhelpfully ambiguous position of the UK Supreme Court in its dialogue with Parliament and 
Parliament’s marginal focus on assisted-dying proposals contrast with the clear message sent by the 
Canadian judiciary in Carter and its legislative aftermath. As Stewart noted, while s.241.2 was a 
departure from Carter, overall the legislative response followed the judgment.306 Bill C-14 confirmed 
the validity of the ‘dialogue’ thesis, showing that Parliament preserves its place in fine-tuning the law 
after the entrenchment of the Charter. Conversely, for Macfarlane, despite the significant policy 
change effected, the new law was a surprising departure from the tendency of legislatures to follow 
courts’ guidance on constitutionally permissible action.307 Given the restriction to terminally ill 
patients, Nicolaides and Hennigar went so far as to conclude that Parliament’s response denied 
judicial supremacy over constitutional interpretation;308 it “directly reject[ed] the Court’s 
interpretation of what the rights set out in section 7 require regarding MAID eligibility”.309 These 
authors view the new law as an expression of “coordinate construction”, a theory according to which 
neither branch of government holds the monopoly on constitutional interpretation and legislative 
responses to judgements can redefine the scope of rights.310 There seems to be, however, scholarly 
disagreement on whether ‘dialogue’ includes legislative attempts to modify a judicial invalidation or 
solely responses consistent with the judgments.311  
 The explanation for the departure of Bill C-14 from a unanimous judgment apparently lies in political 
considerations. According to Snow and Puddister, the adoption of a narrow eligibility scheme was 
the result of mixed responses from polls gauging MAiD support; consequently, “the popular Trudeau 
government seemed averse to spending political capital on this controversial area”.312 Truchon was 
an important test case for the framework of constitutional interpretation in Canada.313 Since the 
executive did not appeal the Quebec judge’s decision that “reasonably foreseeable death” is an 
unlawful requirement, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of s.7 rights will be restored. The federal 
government’s choice to amend legislation following Truchon without waiting for a ‘second look’ 
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VII. Conclusion [A heading: 14 bold] 
 
This chapter has argued that the exceptional availability of physician-assisted dying in Canada after 
the intervention of the Supreme Court strikes a fairer balance between different interests than the 
absolute British ban. A number of commonalities have been nonetheless identified in these 
jurisdictions. Having established that the prohibition on assistance interferes with fundamental rights, 
and that subjective sanctity-of-life ideologies are unsatisfactory justifications, both countries’ 
Supreme Courts have accepted that protecting the vulnerable constitutes a legitimate aim. Their 
conclusions mainly differed as regards the need for a blanket ban and the confidence in a scheme 
authorising assistance in limited circumstances. In the British debate, ‘slippery slope’ arguments 
drawing on fear of abusive or erroneous application of the law have so far prevailed. Conversely, the 
Canadian legal reform has permitted autonomous responses to catastrophic illness, subject to case-
by-case medical assessment. It has been suggested here that a permissive MAiD regime including 
safeguards against abuse avoids the injustice of a bright-line rule that chooses between, as opposed 
to reconciling, competing rights.  
 In the UK, the encroachment upon self-determination rights in the name of speculative threats to 
others remains a disproportionate response to vulnerability issues, despite the DPP’s policy of non-
prosecution of compassionate assistance. Rather, the incongruence between legislative bar and 
administrative toleration compromises the moral justification for the restriction and raises rule-of-law 
concerns. Nor could the blanket ban be successfully mitigated, as Huxtable suggested, by greater 
clarity on the factors used in prosecution or a specific statutory defence.314 The DPP guidelines cannot 
be so prescriptive as to contradict the statute by reading an exemption into it; as Coggon noted, it 
would be improper for the DPP to legislate.315 Parliament’s intervention is essential to ensure a 
legitimate assisted-dying regime, and a statutory exception based on ex ante judicial dispensation or 
medical authorisation is preferable to a legal defence.  
 In fact, any ex post facto assessment of criminal liability offers less protection to the vulnerable than 
an exception allowing prior examination of the case, as less evidence is available to verify consent 
and medical circumstances. The prospect of criminal proceedings also deters patients and potential 
assisters, especially medical professionals, unlikely to risk prosecution for patients unrelated to them. 
Reliance on family members typically limits assisted-dying options to travelling abroad to permissive 
jurisdictions, and the high cost of travel and other arrangements raises equality issues.316 In cases of 
extreme disability, for those unwilling or unable to summon assistance, the choice is between 
indefinite suffering and self-starvation as sole independent recourse. The law also prompts those 
approaching a stage where they would lose their independence to take their lives prematurely, often 
through a violent method. Several rights are compromised as a result: privacy, protection against 
inhuman treatment, right to life, non-discrimination. 
 A regulatory framework for assistance in dying would remove the inconsistencies within medical 
law, which subordinates provision of life-saving treatment to patients’ consent and refers disputes on 
withdrawal of life support for children and incompetent adults to courts, guided by medical opinion. 
If sanctity-of-life and vulnerability considerations do not require the protection of competent adults 
against irrational refusal of life-preserving treatment or investigating whether such refusal was the 
product of undue influence, they should not be invoked to deny patients the choice to end intractable 
suffering and avoid a distressing death. The current ban affects severely disabled and/or impecunious 
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patients who are not vulnerable, and hence not the intended target of the measure, whilst it fails to 
protect vulnerable individuals capable of travelling to Dignitas or ending their lives unaided, by 
disconnecting a life-support machine or otherwise. The interference with fundamental rights is 
therefore both ill-suited to meet its objective and overbroad.  
 Admittedly, removing the blanket ban presents difficulties over the justification of conditions and 
exclusions. Newman cautioned: “once one moves away from a bright-line rule, a law on assisted 
suicide becomes subject to continual questioning concerning the boundary temporarily 
established”.317 However, an unjust ban cannot be maintained solely to avoid addressing access issues 
and potential future challenges. The progressive fine-tuning of the law is inherent in the democratic 
process through which courts and Parliament update legislation, guided by social opinion and taking 
stock of experience. 
 It has also been submitted here that the Canadian Supreme Court’s position in Carter better reflects 
the constitutional role of the judiciary in bringing about reform in sensitive policy areas. Democratic 
law-making relies on courts to place the cause of niche sections of the population on the legislative 
agenda and to advance human-rights protection in controversial, slow-changing aspects of the law. 
The comparative examination of assisted-dying laws in Canada and the UK reveals a profound 
problem of democracy when courts fail to act as a corrective to majoritarian deliberation or inertia-
ridden legislatures.  
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